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The Clash of Obligations: Exercising
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in
Conformance with Transitional Justice
CHRISTEN BROECKER*
I. INTRODUCTION
In April 2009, Judge Shira Scheindlin of the Southern District
of New York issued a much-anticipated opinion in the context of a
set of lawsuits that have generated an extraordinary amount of
attention over the course of the past seven years. The suits,
consolidated and refashioned from a dozen disparate claims into a
pair of federal class actions between 2002 and 2009, were brought
by representatives of a group consisting of potentially tens of
thousands of South African citizens who claim to be victims of
crimes recognized under international law committed by
multinational .corporations - as principles or as accomplices to the
South African government - during the Apartheid era.'
While Judge Schiendlin's opinion on the defendants' motion
to dismiss the case was notable in several respects, one of its most
* Christen L. Broecker, J.D. 2008, and LL.M. in International Legal Studies 2009, New
York University School of Law. This article presents the views of the author, who takes
sole responsibility for its contents. I would like to thank Professors Paul van Zyl and Linda
Silberman of NYU for their instruction and encouragement, Paul Hoffman for
encouraging my interest in this field, and the staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles,
International and Comparative Law Review for their assistance. I would also like to thank
the NYU Institute of International Law and Justice for encouraging my research on this
topic. Finally, I would like to thank Don, Cecilia, and Brian Broecker and Craig Heeren
for their love and support.
1. The claims, brought pursuant to the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. 1350, alleged
that seven multinational corporations - Daimler A.G.; Ford Motor Company; General
Motors Corporation; International Business Machines Corporation (IBM); Fujitsu, Ltd.;
Barclays Bank, PLC; Union Bank of Switzerland, A.G. (UBS); and Rheinmetall Group
A.G. - aided and abetted a host of internationally-prohibited crimes by providing the
South African government with military, logistical, and technological support during the
course of the Apartheid regime. See In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228,
240-44 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
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powerful aspects was the confidence and brevity with which it
dispensed with the vociferous objections to continued adjudication
made by former president Thabo Mbeki of South Africa and his
colleagues.2 A year and a half earlier, in October 2007, a three-
judge panel of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals had similarly
declined to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims, but it had done so in an
extremely lengthy, fractured opinion, ultimately sending the case
back to the District Court for reconsideration.3 Two of the judges
had urged the District Court to consider, in reaching its decision,
both the views of the South African government, which vigorously
opposed the litigation on the grounds that it undermined the
reconciliatory policy pursued by the country during its political
transition, and those of former members of the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission and opposing political groups, trade
unions, and others, who believed that the U.S.-based litigation in
no way imperiled the political or financial stability of the country.'
However, the lone dissenting judge on the panel had reacted in
horror to the majority's suggestion that a foreign court should
have the power to make judgments regarding the legality of acts
committed abroad in the face of a decision by the state where
those acts occurred to decline to punish their perpetrators.' Judge
Korman, a District Court judge sitting by designation, decried the
majority's decision to subject a foreign democratic nation to "the
indignity of having to defend policy judgments that have been
entrusted to it by a free people against an attack by private citizens
and organizations who have lost the political battle at home," and
declared that the dispute was "not the business of the Judicial
Branch of the United States."6
2. Note, however, that in September 2009, South African Minister of Justice and
Constitutional Development Jeffrey Thamsanqa Radebe informed Judge Scheindlin that
in the wake of her ruling, the Government of South Africa was "now of the view that this
Court is an appropriate forum to hear the remaining claims of aiding and abetting in
violation of international law." Letter from Jeffrey Thamsanqa Radebe, MP, to Judge
Shira Scheindlin, September 2009, available at
http://www.khulumani.net/attachments/343-RSA.Min.Justice-letter-J.Scheindlin-9.01.09
.PDF.
3. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 258, 264 (2d Cir. 2007).
4. Id. at 295-96.
5. Id. at 152. (denying defendants' motion to stay the proceedings pending the
Supreme Court's consideration of their petition for certiorari).
6. Id. at 156 (Korman, J., dissenting). In May 2008, the Supreme Court denied the
Khulumani plaintiffs' petition for certiorari on the grounds that it was unable to muster a
quorum of justices to consider the claim. As a result, the plaintiffs have amended their
406 [Vol. 31:405
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Upon reconsideration of the case, Judge Scheindlin's
conclusion regarding the propriety of U.S. adjudication of the
plaintiffs' claims differed starkly from that expressed by Judge
Korman. Her opinion held, first, that her court's adjudication of
the claims against the corporate defendants did not conflict with
the TRC process pursued in South Africa;7 second, that there was
no adequate forum in South Africa capable of adjudicating the
plaintiffs' claims; and third, that litigation in U.S. courts did not
conflict with the broader goals of the TRC process.8 Thus, with
little fanfare, she rejected the corporate defendants' argument that
U.S. court adjudication of the case would "interfere with South
Africa's stated preference that its democratically elected
government provide the exclusive mechanisms to address harms
inflicted by the apartheid-era South African government on South
African citizens in South Africa."9
The 2007 and 2009 Apartheid Litigation decisions are
particularly appropriate illuminations of a series of difficult
questions that have plagued the courts of not only the United
States, but those of several European nations as well, for over two
decades. Is there an internationally-imposed obligation for third-
party states to exercise their jurisdiction over certain egregious
offenses recognized under international law? Even if there is no
obligation, do such states have a right to assert their jurisdiction
over such offenses in the name of pursuing justice and
accountability? Finally, when is it appropriate for third-party states
to decline to do so because the state where those offenses occurred
has decided not to punish their perpetrators? The answers to these
questions could have significant ramifications for the victims of
grave human rights abuses in countries as wide-ranging as
Afghanistan, Algeria, Indonesia, and Haiti, who seek to hold the
perpetrators of universally condemned crimes accountable, but
complaints and are awaiting rehearing by the District Court. See Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. v.
Ntsebeza, 128 S.Ct. 2424 (2008).
7. In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d at 285 (finding that "[tihe TRC
process was not exclusive," as victims were permitted "to sue those who declined to offer
testimony to the TRC," and that the defendants before the court had in fact declined to
offer testimony to the TRC).
8. Id. at 285-86.
9. Id. at 286, n.358 (concluding, "[i]t is not clear to what 'exclusive mechanisms'
defendants are referring. The TRC process was explicitly not exclusive and defendants
have pointed to no other South African forum that has, can, or will adjudicate these
claims").
20091
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who have been denied access to justice in their home countries as a
result of domestic amnesties or other transitional justice
mechanisms that fall short of prosecution. 10
With growing frequency, courts in the United States and
Europe have been placed in the unenviable position of being
asked to weigh the dictates of international criminal and human
rights law against the risk that enforcing these principles that may
ignite conflict or threaten the stability of fragile governments
abroad." These states have increasingly authorized the use of
extraterritorial jurisdiction to allow their courts to adjudicate civil
and criminal disputes stemming from major human rights
atrocities committed abroad. 2 Yet, as a result, their courts have
been confronted with the dilemma of how to enforce international
criminal law while paying an appropriate degree of respect to the
policy decisions of the states where the atrocities occurred, some
of which have enacted amnesties or other measures that shield the
perpetrators of such crimes from accountability.
A recent series of decisions has revealed a growing
international consensus that, at least for a certain number of grave
international law offenses, amnesty is impermissible under any
circumstance. 3 These decisions also suggest that other mechanisms
of transitional justice, such as truth commissions or community
service, which states may employ in lieu of prosecution, as well as
attempts to mitigate punishment through either reduced sentences
or permitting only civil liability, may be considered insufficient as
to forgo prosecution at the international level. " Many
commentators have argued that despite the fact that strong
substantive norms establishing several international crimes exist,
international procedural law imposing a duty to prosecute remains
significantly more limited. 15 If these commentators are correct, and
third-party states have no international legal duty to prosecute
perpetrators of crimes against humanity, extrajudicial executions,
or war crimes committed in the course of internal armed conflicts,
10. See infra Part II.D.
11. See Lloyd Axworthy, Afterword: The Politics of Advancing International Criminal
Justice, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION OF
SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 266-68 (Steven Macedo ed., 2006).
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra Part II.C.
14. Id.
15. See infra Part II.D; see, e.g., Charles P. Trumbull IV, Giving Amnesty a Second
Chance, 25 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 283, 317 (2007).
[Vol. 31:405408
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then national courts exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction face a
difficult task. While several theories of jurisdiction permit third-
party state courts to exercise jurisdiction over international
offenses, they do not require them to do so. 6 In fact, third-party
state courts may have the option to exercise discretion and decline
to adjudicate claims involving certain international offenses under
classic non-justiciability doctrines, such as the doctrine of
international comity or the act of state doctrine.
Thus far, third-party state courts have demonstrated a notable
lack of consistency and coherence in their approaches to amnesty
and other transitional justice mechanisms. 7 The Apartheid
Litigation, in which Judges Korman and Scheindlin - two judges
from the same U.S. federal district court - reached diametrically-
opposed decisions regarding the effect of a single transitional
justice mechanism on the same plaintiffs' claims in the span of less
than two years, is a particularly apt example of the judicial
uncertainty that characterizes this area of international law.
Moreover, a number of decisions in which judges have applied
non-justiciability doctrines in examining amnesties and other
transitional justice mechanisms appear to be based more on the
political ideology or biases of the particular decisionmaker
rendering the opinion. "
This article seeks to explore the recent practice of courts in
the United States,. Europe, and elsewhere that have been
presented with cases presenting a "clash of obligations," in which
judges and prosecutors have had to choose between refusing to
honor an amnesty at the risk of igniting conflict in a transitioning
country and honoring an amnesty that may be impermissible under
international law. In addition, this article seeks to offer guidance
to future courts faced with such a dilemma, proposing a principled
strategy for determining whether a given amnesty deserves
recognition or deference, and if so, how much. Significantly, this
strategy is derived not from pragmatic or political considerations,
but from judicial doctrines deeply established in the legal systems
of several states. In proposing such a principled basis for judicial
and prosecutorial action, this article seeks to mitigate the tendency
of courts to allow powerful actors to award themselves with
16. See infra Part Ill.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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impunity at the very moment in which international law calls most
strongly for accountability. In sum, this article will seek to assist
courts adhering to the rule of international law when it is in danger
of succumbing to the rule of men.
II. THE OBLIGATION TO PUNISH
A. Introduction
For purposes of this article, "amnesty" is defined as an act of
clemency granted by a sovereign to persons who have committed a
crime or a tort, in order to forgive them for their misdeeds. 19
Amnesty, derived from the Greek word amnestia or amnesis,
signifies forgetfulness, oblivion, or the loss of memory. 2 If a
sovereign grants an individual amnesty, that individual is freed
from all criminal or civil liability that may arise out of the
commission of acts covered by the amnesty.2' In the case of a
blanket amnesty, all investigations or court proceedings related to
the covered offenses are terminated upon the grant of amnesty. 22 If
an individual has already been convicted, his or her sentence is
immediately commuted and all liability is expunged.2 A
conditional amnesty may require that a covered individual
perform some act or acts, such as filing a formal application for
amnesty, engaging in some form of truth-telling, demonstrating
contrition, performing community service, or paying reparations
before his or her liability is extinguished. In contrast to pardons,
which are granted only after an individual has been prosecuted
and convicted of a crime, an amnesty may be granted before any
civil or criminal proceedings commence. 2 As noted by the Count
of Peyronet, Minister of Charles X, King of France, "[a]mnesty
does not restore, it erases.... Amnesty turns to the past and
destroys even the first trace of the sea."'
19. See FAUSTIN Z. NTOUBANDI, AMNESTY FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2007).
20. See Norman Weisman, A History and Discussion of Amnesty, 4 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 529, 529 (1972).
21. See NTOUBANDI, supra note 19, at 32-33.
22. See Leila N. Sadat, National Amnesties and Truth Commissions, in UNIVERSAL
JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 203,208-10 (Steven Macedo ed., 2006).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 10.
25. NTOUBANDI, supra note 19, at 11.
410 [Vol. 31:405
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B. The Legacy of Amnesties
A brief survey of the historical application of amnesties
reveals that any prohibition against them is an extremely recent
development. For nearly as long as there have been wars,
revolutions, and violent political transitions, there have been
amnesties granted in their wake. One of the first-recorded
amnesties was granted in 404 B.C., following the revolt of the
Spartan provincial government of Athens after Sparta's defeat of
the Athenians. ' Thrasybulus, the leader of the revolt, imposed an
amnesty forbidding any punishment of the citizens of Athens for
all wrongs committed during the prior regime.27 The purpose of
the amnesty was to "erase civil strife from memory by the
imposition, of legal oblivion."'  Thereafter, general and
unconditional amnesties became a common feature of peace
agreements and legislative enactments following major conflicts
and political transitions. 29 Peace treaties containing general
amnesties concluded the Thirty-Years War in Europe in 1648, the
War of Austrian Succession, the Seven Years War, the French and
Indian War, and the Napoleanic Wars, among others. 3 In 1867,
U.S. President Andrew Johnson authorized an amnesty in the
aftermath of the American Civil War, claiming that punishing war
offenders "could only tend to hinder reconciliation among the
people and national restoration."3' Following World War I, the
Treaty of Lausanne between the Allied Powers and Turkey
granted amnesty to all Turkish nationals, immunizing them from
prosecution for the Armenian massacre of 1915.32
By the 19th century, the practice of imposing amnesties began
to wane. Amnesties were noticeably absent from peace treaties
enacted after a conflict in which a clear winner emerged.3" This
trend culminated in the wake of World War II when the Allied
Powers established the Charter of the International Military
Tribunal of 1945 ("Charter") for the purpose of punishing German
26. Id. at 15-16.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 15-18.
31. Id. at 25 (citing Proclamation No. 15, 15 Stat. 711 (Dec. 25, 1868)).
32. Id. at 19.
33. Id. at 18-19. Amnesties were absent from treaties concluding the early Napoleonic
conflicts, Bismarck's early victories, and World War I (with exceptions including the
Treaty of Lausanne).
2009]
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officials who had committed atrocities during the war. The
Charter led to the establishment of the Nuremberg, Tokyo, and
Control Council No. 10 tribunals. It further established the
principle that individuals could be criminally responsible under
international law for the commission of crimes against peace, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity.'
Over the course of the past 25 years, a number of states,
including Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti,
Uruguay, South Africa, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Peru, Algeria,
and Zimbabwe, have enacted amnesty laws.36 While some of these
amnesties (such as that in Guatemala) purport to exclude a
handful of international crimes from their scope, most amount to
"blanket amnesties" intended to extinguish all criminal and/or civil
liability incurred by covered individuals over a period of time. In
fact, as recently as 2005, Algeria enacted a near-blanket amnesty
intended to resolve civil conflicts.37 In March 2008, the Liberian
TRC, although precluded by statute from offering amnesties to
perpetrators of crimes against humanity and international
humanitarian law violations,38 announced that it would consider
applications for amnesty for all other offenses. 3 The skeptics note
that even though lower courts in some countries have struck down
.34. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82
U.N.T.S. 279.
35. Id. at 20.
36. Trumbull, supra note 15, at 295-96.
37. Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, AIg., Feb. 28, 2006, art. 5. This
provides amnesty to all militants not accused of public bombings, mass murder, and rape.
38. Act to Establish the Truth and Reconciliation Commission [TRC] of Liberia,
June 10, 2004, art. VII, sec. 26(g), available at
http://unmil.org/documents/hr/liberiatrcact.pdf ("The TRC shall enjoy and exercise such
functions and powers as are relevant for the realization of its mandates. Its functions and
powers shall include, but not be limited to ... [r]ecommending amnesty under terms and
conditions established by the TRC ... provided that amnesty or exoneration shall not
apply to violations of international humanitarian law and crimes against humanity in
conformity with international laws and standards.").
39. Press Release, Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia [TRC], TRC
Public Bulletin No. 6, Policy Paper on Application for Amnesty; Application for Amnesty
May be Done in Writing Within a Limited Period Specified by the TRC (Mar. 31, 2008)
(on file with author), available at https://www.trcofliberia.org/news-1/press-releases/trc-
public-bulletin-no-06-policy-paper-on-application-for-amnesty-application-for-amnesty-
may-be-done-in-writing-within-a-limited-period-specified-by-the-trc. In May 2009, some
TRC commissioners recommended amnesty for certain individuals, including
"perpetrators who made full disclosures during the TRC Public Hearings of their actual
roles in the conflict." Liberians Demand War Crimes Prosecutions (May 22, 2009),
available at https://www.trcofliberia.org/news-l/press-releases/liberians-demand-war-
crimes-prosecutions/.
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amnesties for serious crimes under international law,4° the courts
of Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Peru, and South Africa
ultimately affirmed their validity on some legal ground.
Moreover, states have increasingly attempted to pair
amnesties with other transitional justice mechanisms such as
reparations, Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, and reduced
sentences. 42 For example, East Timor's Commission for Reception,
Truth, and Reconciliation granted amnesties for conduct
amounting to war crimes on the condition that the individuals
fulfilled orders for community service and made public apologies
or other remorseful demonstrations. 3 Rwanda's gacaca courts
similarly allow perpetrators of crimes other than rape and torture
to serve half of their sentence in the form of community service
rather than in prison." In 2005, Colombia enacted a Peace and
Justice Law, which provides amnesty for paramilitaries and leftist
guerillas who turn themselves in for crimes not amounting to
''serious crimes under international law," contingent upon
reparations and truth-telling. Moreover, perpetrators of serious
international crimes that comply with the law's "truth-telling" and
reparations requirements are rewarded for their cooperation with
dramatically reduced sentences, ranging from 5-8 years in length.'
Thus, although amnesties have become more controversial over
the course of the last 50 years, they nevertheless remain a tool
available to policymakers dealing with conflict and violence
40. Sadat, supra note22, at 208-10.
41. Id. at 203.
42. See Truth and Reconciliation Commission Law arts. 1(9), 24-29, U.S. INST. OF
PEACE, Oct. 6, 2004 (Indon.) (proposing a TRC that would have allowed the President to
grant amnesty for any crime); Truth and Reconciliation Commission Law, draft, § 25, U.S.
INST. OF PEACE (2007) (Nepal) (providing for a TRC which allowed Commission to
recommend amnesty for serious crimes under international law if they were committed in
the course of one's "duty" or for political purposes during the armed conflict and
conditioning any recommendation for prosecution on the consent of the Government).
43. Commission of Experts to Review the Prosecution of Serious Violations of
Human Rights in Timor-Leste (then East Timor), Report to the Secretary-General,
Summary, UN DOC. S/2005/458 (2005) 339.
44. Stephanie Wolters, The Gacaca Process: Eradicating the Culture of Impunity in
Rwanda?, INST. FOR SECURITY STUD., Aug. 5, 2005, at 5-7, available at
http://www.iss.co.za/Aflcurrent/2005/050805rwanda.pdf.
45. Press Release, Amnesty International, Columbia: Justice and Peace Law Will
Guarantee Impunity for Human Rights Abusers (Apr. 26, 2005) (on file with author),
available at http://www.amnesty.orglenllibrary/asset/AMR23/012/2005/enlal04b2fe-fa2O-
lldd-999c-47605d4edc46/amr230122005en.pdf.
46. Id.
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around the world.
C. From Impunity to Accountability: The Growing Prohibition
Against Amnesties
Despite the enduring use of amnesties described above, an
increasing body of international, regional, and domestic legal
sources purport to prohibit the use of amnesties to eliminate
individual criminal responsibility for certain offenses that rise to
the level of international-level crimes. Since the establishment of
the Nuremberg Charter, several additional treaties have emerged
to codify substantive criminal offenses under international law.1
7
Additionally, a number of authoritative interpretations of those
and other international treaties, as well as a host of decisions by
international and regional courts and a number of non-binding
pronouncements by international bodies, have given rise to the
recognition of additional international crimes. Some treaty-based
and customary international law-based norms have even risen to
the level of jus cogens norms.8 Over the course of the last twenty
years, commentators have argued with increasing persuasiveness
that these jus cogens norms and other norms not only give rise to
substantive international criminal offenses, but also give rise to a
universal duty incumbent upon all states to punish the perpetrators
of those offenses wherever they are subject to jurisdiction. "
1. Treaty-Based Offenses
Soon after the creation of the Charter of the IMT, states
codified the laws of war in a series of treaties. These treaties
confirmed that certain acts, regardless of the military context in
which they were undertaken, were impermissible under
international criminal law and would give rise to liability that
47. See infra Part II.C.1.
48. Jus cogens is defined as "a peremptory norm of general international law ...
accepted and recognized by the international community of States . .. from which no
derogation is permitted .. " Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 53, May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S 331; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 102, comment k (1987) (jus cogens norms "prevail over and
invalidate international agreements and other rules of international law in conflict with
them").
49. See, e.g., Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Punish Human
Rights Violations of Prior Regime, 100 YALE L. J. 2585, 2593 (1991).
[Vol. 31:405
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could not be extinguished by a national amnesty. The four 1949
Geneva Conventions, to which almost every country in the world
is a party, have been recognized as customary international law
binding even states that are not parties.5 " Each Convention
contains a specific enumeration of the grave breaches that
constitute war crimes under international law." Grave breaches in
the context of international armed conflicts 2 include willful killing,
torture or inhuman treatment, willfully causing great suffering or
serious injury to body or health, extensive destruction of property
not justified by military necessity, willfully depriving a civilian of
the rights of fair and regular trial, and unlawful confinement of a
civilian." The Conventions confirm that states have a duty to
prosecute or extradite those suspected of committing grave
breaches. Thus, in the context of international armed conflicts,
there is very little debate that grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions constitute war crimes under international law. Thus,
every state has an obligation to punish perpetrators of such crimes,
regardless of whether or not a given state has purported to
50. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 49, Oct. 21, 1950, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter
Convention for the Amelioration of the Wounded and Sick]; Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea art. 50, Oct. 21, 1950, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Convention for Wounded,
Sick and Shipwrecked]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisons in War
art. 129, Oct. 21, 1950, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Convention to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War art. 146, Oct. 21, 1950, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Convention to the
Protection of Civilian Persons].
51. See, e.g., Convention for the Amelioration of the Wounded and Sick, supra note
50, art. 50.
52. Convention for the Amelioration of the Wounded and Sick, supra note 50, art. 49;
Convention for Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked, supra note 50, art. 50; Convention to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 50, art. 129; Convention to the Protection of
Civilian Persons, supra note 50, art. 146. These Conventions all have identical language
regarding the obligation to prosecute war criminals: "The High Contracting Parties
undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide effective PefiaPefial sanctions for
persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches of the present
Convention .... Each High Contracting party shall be under the obligation to search for
persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed such grave
breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own
courts."
53. Michael P. Scharf, The Amnesty Exception to the Jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 507, 513-525 (1999) (citing Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court art. 8.2(a)-(e), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (2002)
[hereinafter Rome Statute]).
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extinguish their liability through amnesty. 14
Similarly, the UN Convention on Genocide (Genocide
Convention), which the International Court of Justice has
determined constitutes customary international law binding on all
states, codifies genocide as a crime under international criminal
law. " It further requires that states either prosecute offenders or
turn them over to an international court, giving rise to the
inference that amnesties for such offenses warrant no recognition
by third-party states seeking to exercise jurisdiction over them. 6
The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Torture Convention)
states that each Party must criminalize all acts of torture and must
make them punishable by "appropriate Pefialties which take into
account their grave nature." 57 Each state party to the Convention
is obligated to exercise jurisdiction over individuals suspected of
torture in the following instances: if it was committed in their
territory, if the offender is a national, or if the victim is a national
(if the state considers it appropriate, or if the alleged offender is
present in the state's territory and the state does not extradite him
or her). These provisions codify torture and other cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment as offenses under international
law. Furthermore, they signify that there is a duty on states
exercising jurisdiction, at least pursuant to the bases identified in
* the Convention, to punish those individuals regardless of whether
a particular state has purported to extinguish their liability through
amnesty. 9 Additionally, the Torture Committee, which has
authority to interpret the Convention, has publicly stated that
"amnesty laws should exclude torture from their reach" as they
"preclude prosecution of alleged torturers who must, according to
articles 4, 5, and 12 of the Convention, be investigated and
prosecuted." 6o
54. See, e.g., Orentlicher, supra note 49, at 2593.
55. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. 5,
Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
56. Id.
57. United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, arts. 4-5, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85
[hereinafter Torture Convention].
58. Id. at art. 5.
59. Id.
60. Committee Against Torture, Concluding Observations on Peru, 9 49, 61, U.N.
Doc. A/55/44 (Nov. 19, 2000) [hereinafter Concluding Observations on Peru].
See also Committee Against Torture, Concluding Observations on Azerbaijan 69, U.N.
416 [Vol. 31:405
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Taken together, the Geneva Conventions, the Genocide
'Convention, and the Torture Convention give rise to a body of
broadly-recognized treaty-based offenses under international
criminal law. Under international law, states are permitted to
exercise their jurisdiction over perpetrators of such offenses,
whether or not the state in which the offense occurred has enacted
an amnesty. However, scholars, international bodies, courts, and
commentators have argued with increasing frequency that these
are not the only international crimes for which an "obligation to
punish" exists. 61
2. Offenses Under Customary International Law
Certainly, there are several ways in which a rule of
international law, such as the articulation of an internationally-
recognized crime, can come about. One, discussed above, is
through international agreement, such as in the form of a treaty.62
However, rules of international law can also be articulated in the
form of customary international law, which "results from a general
and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of
legal obligation." 63 Rules of customary international law are thus
discerned from observing the practice of states, as well as the
pronouncements of bodies created by States to evaluate their
compliance with and obligations under international law. It is also
possible for such customary international law-based crimes to be
accompanied by an obligation to punish, even in the absence of an
existing treaty that articulates such an obligation (like the Geneva
Conventions), so long as that obligation is independently rooted in
customary international law as well.
The international offense rooted in customary international
law most frequently claimed by scholars to be accompanied by a
corresponding "obligation to punish" is the umbrella offense
referred to as "crimes against humanity." First codified in the
Charter of the IMT, crimes against humanity are also codified by
the Rome Statute in Article 7. ' Over the course of the past twenty
Doc. A/55144 (Nov. 19, 2000) [hereinafter Concluding Observations on Azerbaijan].
61. Orentlicher, supra note 49, at 2585.
62. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102(1)(b) (1987).
63. Id. § 102(2) (1987).
64. Rome Statute, supra note 53, at art. 7 (defining crimes against humanity as: "any
of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against
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years, numerous authorities have asserted that states are obligated
to punish suspected perpetrators of crimes against humanity
through the use of whatever jurisdictional bases they have at their
disposal. 6 In making this argument, they point to several
pronouncements by international authorities claiming that
amnesties covering such crimes are impermissible. These include
the Secretary General of the United Nations, who has stated that
"amnesty cannot be granted in respect of international crimes,
such as. .. crimes against humanity,"' that "United Nations-
endorsed peace agreements can never promise amnesties for
crimes against humanity,"6" and that the Security Council should
reject endorsements of amnesty for crimes against humanity and
"should ensure that no amnesty previously granted is a bar to
prosecution before any United Nations-created or assisted
court." 6
Finally, some scholars go even further, looking to subsidiary
sources of international law to determine that an even broader
category of "gross" or "serious" violations of human rights (often
including offenses such as summary execution and enforced
disappearances) are accompanied by an "obligation to punish."
Sources of law pointing to a customary international law obligation
include the Secretary General's report on the Rule of Law and
Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict societies, which
states that UN-endorsed peace agreements should never promise
any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: (a) Murder; (b) Extermination; (c)
Enslavement; (d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population; (e) Imprisonment or
other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of
international law; (f) torture, (g) rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced
pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable
gravity; (h) persecutions against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial,
national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender...or other grounds that are universally
recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act referred
to in this paragraph or any other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court; (i) enforced
disappearance of persons; () the crime of apartheid; (k) Other inhumane acts of a similar
character internationally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or
physical health.").
65. Orentlicher, supra note 49, at 2585, 2593.
66. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a
Special Court for Sierra Leone, 22, delivered to the Security Council and the General
Assembly, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (Oct. 4,2002).
67. The Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Rule of Law and
Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, 10, delivered to the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004).
68. Id. T 64(c).
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amnesties for "gross violations of human rights"69 Additionally,
the General Assembly's "Right to a Remedy Principles," 70 states
that "[i]n cases of gross violations of international human rights
law and serious violations of international humanitarian law
constituting crimes under international law, States have the duty to
investigate and, if there is sufficient evidence, the duty to submit to
prosecution the person allegedly responsible for the violations and,
if found guilty, the duty to punish her or him." 7' The UN Human
Rights Commission, in referring to the Principles for the
Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to
Combat Impunity (Impunity Principles), has recognized "that
amnesties should not be granted to those who commit violations of
human rights and international humanitarian law that constitute
crimes." 72
Ironically, some recent comments by the Human Rights
Commission, the body with authority to interpret the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),73 suggest that
when states offer amnesties for conduct that constitutes a breach
of the state's treaty obligations under the ICCPR, the amnesty
itself gives rise to a duty incumbent on other States Parties to the
Covenant to punish the violators themselves. This effect results
from the fact that the ICCPR codifies the right to an "effective
remedy." 71 In a 2004 Comment, the Committee stated that where
69. Id. 10.
70. Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law ("Right to a Remedy Principle"), G.A. Res. 60/147, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/60/147 (Dec. 16,2005).
71. Id.
72. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm'n on Human Rights, Report to
the Economic and Social Council on the Sixty-First Session of the Commission, 3, 21,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/L.10/Add. 17 (Apr. 21, 2005) (prepared by Deirdre Kent) ("States
must ensure that those responsible for serious crimes under international law are
prosecuted, tried, and duly punished").
73. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR], Human Rights
Comm., General Comment No. 31 [80], The Nature of the General Legal Obligation
Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, 18, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13, 91
15 (May 26, 2004) [hereinafter General Comment No. 31].
74. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR], G.A. Res. 2200A
(XXI), 2, 6-7, 15, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966)- ("Each Party to the present
Convention undertakes: (a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein
recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation
has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity; (b) To ensure that any
person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by competent
judicial, administrative, or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority
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investigations, which are required in order for individuals to have
accessible and effective remedies for the vindication of their
rights," reveal violations of rights recognized as criminal under
domestic or international law, "States Parties must ensure that
those responsible are brought to justice." 6 The Comment further
stated that "where public officials or State agents have committed
violations of [these rights], the States Parties concerned may not
relieve perpetrators from personal responsibility, as has occurred
with certain amnesties," and that "States parties should also assist
each other to bring to justice persons suspected of having
committed acts in violation of the Covenant that are punishable
under domestic or international law."" The General Comment
confirmed that "every State Party has a legal interest in the
performance by every other State Party of its obligations.""
Moreover, this Comment was not the only indication that the
Committee believes that amnesties may give rise to a third-party
obligation to punish in the case of serious violations of human
rights: rather, the Committee has expressed concern and
disapproved of national amnesties in the past, both in the context
of Concluding Observations on specific countries and in the course
of adjudication under the ICCPR's complaints mechanism."
provided for by the legal system of the State.").
75. Id.
76. Id. at 18; see also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR],
Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 20: Article 7 (Prohibition of Torture, or
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment), 2, 13-15, U.N. Doc.
A/47/40 (March 10, 1992) ("Amnesties are generally incompatible with the duty of States
to investigate [torture], to guarantee freedom from such acts within their jurisdiction; and
to ensure that they do not occur in the future").
77. General Comment No. 31, supra note 73, 18.
78. Id. at 2.
79. See U.N. Human Rights Council [HRC], Concluding Observations on Senegal, at
23, 103, UN Doc. A/48/40 Vol. 1 (1993) ("[P]articular concern was expressed over the
danger that the amnesty laws might be used to grant impunity to officials responsible for
violations, who had to be brought to justice." ); U.N. Human Rights Council [HRC],
Concluding Observations on Niger, at 88, [.425, U.N. Doc. A/48/40 Vol. 1 (1993) ("The
Committee considers that the agents of the State responsible for such human rights
violations should be tried and punished. They should in no case enjoy immunity, inter alia,
through an amnesty law."); Vicente v. Colombia, 8.8, CCPR/C/60/D/612/1995 (1995)
("[T]he State party has a duty to investigate thoroughly alleged violations of human rights,
particularly enforced disappearances and violations of the right to life, and to criminally
prosecute, try, and punish those deemed responsible for such violations."); Rodriguez v.
Uruguay, 1 6.3, 12.4, CCPR/C/311D/194/1985 (1985) ("[A]s a result of Law No. 15,848 no
PefiaPefial sanctions could be imposed on persons responsible for torture and ill-treatment
of prisoners .... The Committee moreover reaffirms its position that amnesties for gross
violations of human rights and legislation such as the Law No. 15,848 ... are incompatible
420 [Vol. 31:405
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3. International, Regional, and State Court Decisions on the
Obligation to Punish
Over the course of the last two decades, several regional and
international claims mechanisms have declared that the obligation
to punish perpetrators of a variety of internationally recognized
crimes and/or human rights violations is supreme and that state
efforts to thwart that obligation through amnesties are illegitimate.
In turn, scholars have relied on these decisions in asserting that the
obligation to punish perpetrators of such offenses, despite the fact
that the territorial state in which they were committed has enacted
an amnesty or other transitional justice mechanism, is rooted in
customary international law. "
In the course of interpreting the American Convention on
Human Rights, the Inter-American Court and Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights have been particularly insistent
about the affirmative right of states to investigate human rights
abuses and to punish those who violate them through the use of
criminal sanctions. 81 The Inter-American Court first outlined the
duty to punish in its 1988 Velasquez-Rodriguez case, in which it
found that Honduras had a legal duty to "take reasonable steps...
to carry out a serious investigation of [human rights] violations...
to identify those responsible, to impose the appropriate
punishment and to ensure the victim adequate compensation."8 2
Eight years later, the Inter-American Commission of Human
Rights relied on the Court's decision in finding that Chile's
amnesty laws violated the right the state's duty to "prevent,
investigate and punish any violation of the rights recognized by the
Convention."'83 In 2001, the Inter-American Court endorsed the
Commission's finding that amnesty laws are incompatible with the
with the obligations of the State party under the Covenant").
80. Emily W. Schabacker, Reconciliation or Justice and Ashes: Amnesty Commissions
and the Duty to Punish Human Rights Offenses, 12 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 1 (1999); see also
Douglass Cassel, Lessons .from the Americas: Guidelines for International Response to
Amnesties for Atrocities, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197 (1996).
81. See, e.g., Velasquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, Inter-Am C.H.R. (ser. C) No. 4 (July
29, 1988); Hermosilla v. Chile, Case 10.843, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 36/39, 73
(1996); Barrios Altos Case (Chumbipuma Aguirre y otros v. Peru), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.,
(ser. C) No. 75 (March 14, 2001).
82. Velasquez-Rodriguez, (ser. C) No. 4, at 174.
83. Hermosilla, Case 10.843, at 1 72, 73.
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state's duty to punish in the Barrios Altos case, finding that Peru's
self-amnesty laws were manifestly incompatible with the aims and
spirit of the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights and
stating that the court would refuse to honor any measure designed
to eliminate criminal responsibility, "because they are intended to
prevent the investigation and punishment of those responsible for
serious human rights violations such as torture, extrajudicial,
summary or arbitrary execution and forced disappearance, all of
them prohibited because they violate non-derogable rights
recognized by international human rights law." 4
Additionally, two international-level judicial decisions suggest
that amnesties are incompatible with the obligation to punish
certain internationally-recognized crimes inherent in customary
international law. First, in Prosecutor v. Furundzija, a Trial
Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) about states passing amnesty laws covering perpetrators of
torture:
[Tihe national measures, violating the general [prohibition
against torture] and any relevant treaty provision, would.., not
be accorded international legal recognition. Proceedings could
be initiated by potential victims if they had locus standi before a
competent international or national judicial body with a view to
asking it to hold the national measure to be internationally
unlawful; or the victim could bring a civil suit for damage in a
foreign court, which would therefore be asked inter alia to
disregard the legal value of the national authorising act....
[P]erpetrators of torture acting upon or benefiting from those
national measures may nevertheless be held criminally
responsible for torture, whether in a foreign State, or in their
own State under a subsequent regime (emphasis in original). 85
Secondly, in 2004, the Special Court for Sierra Leone's
Appeals Chamber ruled that a national amnesty for serious
international crimes could not bind that court, finding that there is
a "crystallising international norm that a government cannot grant
amnesty for serious crimes under international law" and that such
"a norm that governments cannot grant amnesties for serious
crimes under international law before their own national courts is
developing under international law."
84. Barrios Altos Case, (ser. C) No. 75, at $ 41,43.
85. Prosecutor v. Furund~ija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, T 155 (Dec. 10, 1998).
86. Prosecutor v. Kallon, Case No. SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), Decision on Challenge
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Finally, scholars and courts point to decisions by the courts of
Argentina, Peru, and Colombia, which have each invalidated at
least part of an exculpatory law in their country on the basis that it
conflicted with an international obligation to punish certain
crimes. '
D. An Uncertain Rule: Counterarguments against the Prohibition
Despite this growing body of evidence suggesting that a host
of offenses are not only prohibited under international law, but
also give rise to a universal duty to punish the perpetrators of such
offenses, a number of scholars continue to insist that there is an
"emerging norm in international law that requires accountability -
but not necessarily prosecution - for serious violations of
international law." These scholars do not dispute that grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions in the course of international
armed conflict, genocide, and perhaps torture, give rise to such a
duty, as these obligations are codified in treaties that have enjoyed
nearly universal accession.' However, they note that insofar as the
duty to prosecute Grave Breaches of the Geneva Convention is
limited to the context of international (not internal) armed
conflicts,' ° and insofar as there is no treaty-based obligation for
to Jurisdiction: Lom6 Accord Amnesty, If 72, 82, 88 (Mar. 13, 2004); Prosecutor v.
Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-I, Indictment (Mar. 3, 2003) (Domestic amnesty cannot
apply to international crime).
87. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 14/6/2005, "Sim6n, Julio Hdctor/ Privaci6n
Ilegitima de la Libertad," Colecci6n Oficial de Fallos de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la
Naci6n [Fallos] (2005-2-2171) (Arg.) (Argentine Supreme Court declares two laws
blocking prosecution for crimes committed during the "Dirty War" between 1976 and
1983 to be unconstitutional and void); Corte Constitucional [CC], 18/5/2006, "Ley De
Justicia Y Paz / se revisa la constitucionalidad de la Ley 975 de 2005," Jurisprudencia Y
Doctrina (2006-35-1807) (Colom.) (Colombian Constitutional Court strikes down
provisions of a law authorizing significant sentence reductions for demobilized combatants
who confessed to committing internationally-prohibited crimes); Quinto Juzgado
PefiaPefial Especial [QJPE], 2/7/2003 (Peru) (Peruvian lower court dismisses challenges to
a prosecution on the basis of amnesty on the basis that the amnesty contravened the
American Convention).
88. Trumbull, supra note 15 at 319 (emphasis added).
89. Scharf, supra note 53, at 519.
90. See Convention for the Amelioration of the Wounded and Sick, supra note 50,
art. 2, 49-50; Convention for Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked, supra note 50, art. 2, 49-50;
Convention to the Treatment of-Prisoners of War, supra note 50, art. 2, 129; Convention to
the Protection of Civilian Persons, supra note 50, art. 2, 129; However, that does not mean
states or international tribunals lack permissive authority to prosecute persons who
commit war crimes in internal armed conflicts. Rome Statute, supra note 53, at art. 8.2(c),
(e).
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states to punish crimes against humanity, extrajudicial execution,
arbitrary detention, or a host of other offenses, any duty to punish
those crimes must stem from customary international law.9 Thus,
the proponents of a duty to punish these crimes must prove that
there is a general and consistent practice of states of prosecuting
perpetrators of such crimes out of a sense of legal obligation, or
opino jurs.9 2
On the issue of a "legal obligation" to punish, skeptics
criticize proponents of this duty and their weak legal support for
often relying only on judicial decisions from special tribunals,
regional courts, and non-binding pronouncements from the
Secretary General, General Assembly, and UN treaty bodies like
the HRC and CAT. 9' Moreover, skeptics' claims are bolstered by a
SCSL recent decision, which found that that "there is not yet any
general obligation for States to refrain from amnesty laws on Uus
cogens] crimes," and that states do not "breach a customary
[international law] rule" in granting such amnesties in the absence
of contrary treaty obligations. 9 Even the Chairman of the Rome
Diplomatic Conference acknowledged that the Rome Statute does
not automatically preclude amnesties. ' Rather, several provisions
reflect "creative ambiguity" which potentially permits the ICC to
recognize an amnesty exception to the court's jurisdiction.' These
actions all demonstrate that the rule against recognizing amnesties
may be less hard and fast than proponents of the duty to punish
91. See Scharf, supra note 53.
92. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102(2) comment c (1987) ("For a practice of states to become a rule of customary
international law it must appear that the states follow the practice from a sense of legal
obligation (opinio juris sive necessitatis); a practice that is generally followed but which
states feel legally free to disregard does not contribute to customary law.").
93. Scharf, supra note 53, at 521 (Those who argue that customary international law
precludes amnesty for crimes against humanity base their position on non-binding General
Assembly Resolutions, hortative declarations of international conferences, and
international conventions that are not widely ratified, rather than on any extensive state
practice consistent with such a rule.).
94. Prosecutor v. Kallon & Kambara, Case Nos. SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), SCSL-
2004-16-AR72, Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction, 71 (Mar. 13, 2004).
95. Scharf, supra note 53, at 521-22.
96- Id. at 522-525 (For example, Article 16 requires the Court to defer prosecution in
favor of a national amnesty if the Security Council adopts a resolution under Chapter VII
of the UN Charter requesting the Court to do so; Article 53 provides the Prosecutor with
prosecutorial discretion to choose to respect an amnesty deal and thereby terminate an
investigation or prosecution if he concludes there are "substantial reasons to believe that
an investigation would not serve the best interests of justice.").
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acknowledge.
Moreover, as Michael Scharf as noted, "[t]o the extent that
any state practice in this area is widespread, it is the practice of
granting amnesties or de facto impunity to those who commit
crimes against humanity."' The skeptics of the duty to punish note
that - as detailed in the Introduction - a host of states have
enacted amnesties over the course of the last 25 years, Finally,
skeptics emphasize that a number of third-party states facilitated
or publicly endorsed the granting of amnesties issued by
transitioning states, including the United States, which encouraged
the Haitian amnesty in 1993. Mexico, Norway, Spain, Venezuela,
and Colombia (and again the United States) all subsequently
facilitated the peace process and amnesty in Guatemala.98 As late
as 2005, both the United States and France indicated that they
would recognize the Algerian amnesty, even though it applies to
serious crimes under international law. '
As noted above, states have increasingly attempted to pair
amnesties with other transitional justice mechanisms such as
reparations and Truth and Reconciliation Commissions.,
Whether these additional mechanisms suffice to satisfy the
territorial state's duty under international human rights law to
provide victims of atrocities with a remedy remains highly
contended. This is evident by the views of scholars and courts
which insist that "accountability" for rights violations requires
"prosecution." 101 The secondary question of whether these
additional procedures satisfy an international duty to prosecute
perpetrators of internationally-recognized crimes remains similarly
unresolved.
97. Id. at 521.
98. Trumbull, supra note 15, at 297-98.
99. Id. at 298.
100. See Truth and Reconciliation Commission Law arts. 1(9), 24-29, U.S. INST. OF
PEACE, Oct. 6, 2004 (Indon.) (proposing a TRC that would have allowed the President to
grant amnesty for any crime); Truth and Reconciliation Commission Law, draft, § 25, U.S.
INST. OF PEACE (2007) (Nepal) (providing for a TRC which allowed Commission to
recommend amnesty for serious crimes under international law if they were committed in
the course of one's "duty" or for political purposes during the armed conflict and
conditioning any recommendation for prosecution on the consent of the Government).
101. See, e.g., Velasquez-Rodriguez, (ser. C) No. 4, 166; Barrios Altos Case, (ser. C)
No. 75, at 41; Orentlicher, supra note 49, at 2593.
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E. Conclusion
The state of international law regarding the "duty to punish"
is in large part uncertain, as evidenced by the vociferous debate
over an internationally-recognized duty of all states to assert
jurisdiction over and punish perpetrators of internationally-
recognized crimes. "0 Both camps agree that for certain treaty-
based offenses - namely genocide, grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions, and torture (albeit on potentially more limited
jurisdictional grounds) - such a duty to punish exists as a specific
rule of international law, and states are obligated to disregard any
national amnesty purporting to otherwise extinguish a
perpetrator's liability. 103 However, whether there is an
international duty to punish non-treaty-based international
offenses, such as crimes against humanity and war crimes in an
internal conflict, is far less clear. Finally, it is uncertain what effect,
if any, other transitional justice measures will have on the
international duty to punish offenders of any of the above-
mentioned international crimes.
It is with this somewhat ambiguous legal standard that the
courts of third-party states, purporting to exercise "universal" or
other forms of extraterritorial jurisdiction, are presented when
they attempt to hear claims against individuals accused of violating
international criminal law abroad. If proponents of the
international duty to punish a wide range of international crimes
are correct, then third-party states have no obligation to recognize
a domestic amnesty. Rather, they have an obligation to disregard
such measures. In this scenario, domestic amnesties would
constitute impermissible attempts by a single state to thwart
international law binding on the entire international community.
However, if the skeptics are correct and there is no international
duty to punish those who have committed crimes against
humanity, war crimes in the context of internal armed conflicts,
and other offenses such as extrajudicial execution and arbitrary
detention, then states could establish jurisdiction over violators of
international law, but there would be no mandatory obligation to
do so. If universal and extraterritorial jurisdictions are merely
permissive, then third-party states and their courts would have the
freedom to decline jurisdiction over international crimes on a
102. See Orentlicher, supra note 49, at 2585; Trumbull, supra note 15, at 297.
103. Id.
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discretionary basis.
The remainder of this paper will examine the standards - or
lack thereof - which the courts of third-party states have followed
when evaluating whether to give effect to a domestic amnesty or
other transitional justice measure falling short of prosecution. The
article will conclude by proposing a more principled approach by
which courts faced with the choice of whether to decline to
exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction because an offender's home
state has enacted an amnesty covering the crimes of which he or
she is accused.
III. THIRD-PARTY STATE TREATMENT OF DOMESTIC AMNESTIES-
A SURVEY OF GLOBAL APPROACHES
A. Introduction- Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Over the course of the last two decades, as the concept of
individual criminal liability under international law has become
increasingly accepted and as nations have enacted regulations in
the transnational areas of trade, antitrust, securities, and other
commercial matters with increasing frequency, the courts of those
nations have become increasingly comfortable with exercising
jurisdiction over claims arising outside of their own borders. 104 As
the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States confirms, there are several internationally-recognized bases
on which a state can apply its own laws and regulations to conduct
arising elsewhere. " States are permitted to prescribe law with
respect to "conduct outside [their] territory that has or is intended
to have a substantial effect within [their] territory" (the effects
doctrine) " ; actions and interests of their nationals outside their
territory (the nationality principle) "7; "conduct outside [their]
territory by persons not its nationals that is directed against the
security of the state" (the protective principle)10; and "certain
offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal
concern," even in the absence of other bases of jurisdiction
104. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Universal Jurisdiction in Europe: The State of the
Art, 18 Hum. Rts. Watch 5(D), June 27, 2006, at 25-26, 58 available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/ijO606/ijO606web.pdf.
105. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 402 (1987).
106. Id. at § 402(1)(c).
107. Id. at § 402(2).
108. Id. at § 402(3).
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(universal jurisdiction). 109
Of these four bases, universal jurisdiction is certainly the most
controversial. "°  The Restatement declares that "universal
jurisdiction.., is a result of universal condemnation of those
activities and general interest in cooperating to suppress them," .
and that the list of offenses, while including "piracy, slave trade,
attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes," is subject
to expansion and may encompass claims (for example, based on
certain acts of terrorism and other offenses) other than those
specifically articulated in the Restatement. 12 The list of offenses
giving rise to universal jurisdiction is contested as well, in part
because the Restatement is merely an interpretation of
international law and not legally binding, even for courts in the
United States. 1' However, the controversial nature of universal
jurisdiction - and the less controversial, but still occasionally
contested practice of extraterritorial jurisdiction - has not
prevented it from becoming increasingly accepted and utilized by
courts in North America and Europe."' As the following
109. Id. at § 404.
110. For example, several governments have recently expressed the position that
exercise of universal jurisdiction itself impermissibly intrudes on the sovereignty of other
nations, regardless of whether or not a supposedly "impermissible" amnesty is at issue. In
the context of an amicus brief filed in support of 38 multinational corporations named as
defendants in an ATS claim stemming from their transactions with the South African
government during the apartheid era, the US government stated, "a suit brought in United
States court to redress those wrongs is not a proper function of a United States court and
will often be viewed by the foreign state's new government as an infringement on its
sovereignty." Brief of the Solicitor General of the United States, In re Apartheid
Litigation, 76 USLW 3405 (Jan 10, 2008) (petition for certiorari) at 19.18. Other countries
have similarly protested that the assertion of authority over their own nationals with
regard to their conduct in a third country is "inconsistent with established principles in
international law" (See Aide Memoire from the Government of Switzerland) and that
such assertion "infringes the sovereign rights of States to regulate their citizens and
matters within their territory" (See letter to U.S. Secretary of State from British
Ambassador, on behalf of the Government of the United Kingdom, with concurrence of
the Government of Germany).
111. RESTATEMENT (TI4IRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 404, comment a (1987).
112. Id.
113. See id. at Foreward, IX, ("The formulation of legal rules in the Restatement is the
considered opinion of The American Law Institute. As was said of the prior Restatement,
it is 'in so sense an official document of the United States.' The American Law Institute is
a private organization, not affiliated with the United States Government or any of its
agencies. In a number of particulars the formulations in [the] Restatement are at variance
with positions that have been taken by the United States Government.").
114. For a comprehensive overview of the exercise of universal jurisdiction in Europe,
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discussion demonstrates, these courts are varied in their
approaches to dealing with truth commissions, amnesties, attempts
at mitigation, and other transitional justice mechanisms.
B. The United Kingdom
The United Kingdom permits courts in England and Wales to
exercise universal jurisdiction over torture " 5 and certain war
crimes including grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and
Additional Protocol I, "6 and to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction
(on the basis of territoriality or nationality/residence) over
genocide and crimes against humanity. 17
By far the most well-known instance in which universal
jurisdiction has been exercised against- an individual accused of
committing internationally-prohibited offenses, despite the fact
that a domestic amnesty purported to immunize that individual, is
the Pinochet case in the United Kingdom, the final judgment of
which was issued in 1999 by the House of Lords. "8 In 1996,
individuals from Argentina and Chile, who were unable to bring
claims against the military leaders of those countries because of
amnesty laws enacted by their governments, filed criminal
complaints in Spain alleging counts of torture and conspiracy to
commit torture, as well as other offenses. " Among those
complaints was one accusing General Pinochet of bearing primary
responsibility for over 2,000 "disappearances" and killings over the
course of his 1973-1990 dictatorship. 120 In October 1998, while
General Pinochet was in Britain, a Spanish judge petitioned the
see Human Rights Watch, supra note 104. In 2003, Mexico agreed to extradite a former
Argentine military official to Spain to face trial for offenses committed in Argentina
during its "Dirty War." The Mexican Supreme Court authorized Cavallo's extradition on
charges of genocide and terrorism, but not on charges of torture, which a lower court had
barred on grounds of an expired statute of limitations. See Gretchen Peters, Mexico Gives
Boost to Universal Jurisdiction, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 16, 2003, available at
http://news.findlaw.com/csmonitor/s/20030616/16jun2003902750.html.
115. Criminal Justice Act, 1988, c. 33, § 134 (Eng.), available at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/actsl988[Ukpga-19880033 en 1.htm.
116. Geneva Conventions Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 52, §§ 1, 1A, (Eng.), available at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/RevisedStatutes/Acts/ukpga/1957/cukpga-19570052-en1.
117. International Criminal Court Act, 2001, c. 17, §§ 50, 51 (Eng.), available at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/ACTS/acts2001/20010017.htm.
118. In re Pinochet, 38 I.L.M. 430 (1999) [hereinafter Pinochet, Final Judgment].
119. NAOMI ROHT-ARRIAZA, THE PINOCHET EFFEcT, 32-66 (U. Penn. Press 2005).
120. Id. at 47.
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British authorities to arrest him, and they complied. 121 General
Pinochet challenged the authority of the British government to
extradite him to Spain, saying that he enjoyed both head-of-state
immunity for the crimes he was accused of committing and that he
benefited from the amnesty enacted in his home country in 1978.122
Pinochet's attorneys argued that even if the court found that it had
the authority to exercise jurisdiction over him, it should
nevertheless decline to do so on the ground of non-justiciability.
They claimed that decisions relating to the recognition of the
Chilean amnesty were a matter of domestic concern, and the state
had already appointed a Truth and Reconciliation Commission in
1990 as its method of dealing with the legacy of violence during
that period of its history. 12
Both the initial (November 1998) and final (March 1999)
House of Lords decisions determined that General Pinochet was
not immune from prosecution for torture and conspiracy to
commit torture committed after the United Kingdom ratified the
Torture Convention in 1998.2 However, both judgments
contained language suggesting that the British courts could decline
to prosecute a perpetrator of universally-prohibited crimes on the
basis of a foreign state's amnesty laws. 12 Lord Lloyd of Berwick
was particularly adamant on this point in the initial House of
Lords decision. 126 He noted an expert testifying on Pinochet's
behalf opined that the situation in Chile at the time was
precarious, and if foreign courts were to intervene, the balance
achieved by Chile's Truth and Reconciliation Commission might
be undermined. 127 Referring to this testimony in detail, Lord Lloyd
121. Id. at 33-35.
122. ld. at 41.
123. Id.
124. Pinochet, Final Judgment, 38 I.L.M. at 904; Regina v. Bow St. Metropolitan
Stipendiary Magistrate, 3 W.L.R. 1456 (1998) [hereinafter Pinochet, Initial Judgment].
125. Id.
126. See Pinochet, Initial Judgment, 3 W.L.R. at 1479-96.
127. Id. at 1482 (discussing evidence presented by Professor Walters that "there are
grave concerns in Chile that the continued detention and attempted prosecution of
Senator Pinochet in a foreign court will upset the delicate political balance and transition
to democracy that has been achieved since the institution of democratic rule in Chile. It is
felt that the current stable position has been achieved by a number of internal measures
including the establishment and reporting of the Rettig Commission on Truth and
Reconciliation. The intervention of a foreign court in matters more proper to internal
domestic resolution may seriously undermine the balance achieved by the present
democratic government.").
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further noted that he was not convinced that a prohibition against
amnesties for crimes such as torture was solidified in customary
international law. " Noting that recent state practice suggested
that amnesty was permissible, Lord Lloyd concluded that even if
General Pinochet did not enjoy head-of-state immunity, there
were "compelling reasons" for the court to find the case non-
justiciable on other grounds. 2' Lord Lloyd made clear that he
based his finding of non-justiciability not on a specific legal
doctrine, but rather on the ground that the courts of the United
Kingdom were "simply not competent to adjudicate,"" because,
in his words, "we are not an international court." "' For an English
court to investigate, and pronounce on the validity of amnesty in
Chile would be to assert jurisdiction over the internal affairs of
that state at the very time when the Supreme Court in Chile is
itself performing the same task." 132 Furthermore, Lord Lloyd
declared that even if the UK Parliament had provided for the
exercise of universal jurisdiction in the Criminal Justice Act, the
demands of the non-justiciability doctrine should take precedent. 131
In the final Pinochet judgment, Lord Saville of Newdigate, in
overruling Lord Lloyd's reasoning, held that the doctrine of non-
justiciability does not apply to cases involving treaties which set
out an obligation to extradite or prosecute and where one of the
parties is a state objecting to England's jurisdiction. '3 Because
Chile, Spain, and England had all been parties to the Torture
Convention since 1988, Lord Saville found that they had "clearly
and unambiguously agreed that official torture should now be
dealt with in a way which would otherwise amount to an
128. Id. at 1490 ("Further light is shed on state practice by the widespread adoption of
amnesties for those who have committed crimes against humanity including torture. Chile
was not the first in the field. There was an amnesty at the end of the Franco-Algerian War
in 1962. In 1971 India and Bangladesh agreed not to pursue charges of genocide against
Pakistan troops accused of killing about 1 million East Pakistanis. General amnesties have
also become common in recent years, especially in South America, covering members of
former regimes accused of torture and other atrocities. Some of these have had the
blessing of the United Nations, as a means of restoring peace and democratic government.
. state practice does not at present support an obligation to extradite or prosecute in all
cases.").
129. Pinochet, Initial Judgment, 3 W.L.R. at 1494.
130. Id. at 1495.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. (citing Lord Wilberforce in Buttes Gas and Oil Co. v. Hammer [1982] A.C.
888).
134. Regina v. Bow St. Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, 2 W.L.R. 827 (1999).
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interference in their sovereignty," and that arguments based on
non-justiciability were not applicable. 
1 3
-
Lord Saville's approach to amnesty laws that target
extraditable or prosecutable offenses for which states have a
treaty-based obligation is in line with the opinions of other courts
and scholars who have considered the issue. Scholars on both sides
of the debate have acknowledged that third-party states have clear
obligations when it comes to exercising jurisdiction over
allegations of genocide, torture, and grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions. 136 Insofar as Lord Lloyd of Berwick invoked the
doctrine of non-justiciability with respect to those crimes, his
opinion runs afoul of an increasingly clear international legal
obligation incumbent not only on parties to the Genocide
Convention, Torture Convention, and Geneva Conventions, but
upon third-party states as a matter of customary international
law. 137
C. Spain
Spain recognizes universal jurisdiction and has exercised it
more frequently than its European counterparts. Article 23.4 of
Spain's Law on Judicial Power states that Spain's courts can
exercise extraterritorial or universal jurisdiction for crimes
including genocide, terrorism, and crimes that "under international
treaties and agreements, must be prosecuted in Spain." 1
8
In the 2007 Scilingo case, the Supreme Court held that Spain
had jurisdiction to prosecute an Argentine navy officer present in
Spanish territory for crimes against humanity based on allegations
that he perpetrated dozens of extrajudicial executions during
Argentina's Dirty War. 139 The court reached this conclusion
despite Scilingo's argument that the Spanish courts should
recognize Argentina's amnesty laws as extinguishing his liability
for the offenses. ", The tribunal countered that the amnesty had no
135. Id. at 904.
136. See generally ANDREW CLAPMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-
STATE ACTORS (Academy of Eurpoean Law ed., Oxford University Press 2006).
137. See Regina, 2 W.L.R. at 904.
138. Mugambi Jouet, Spain's Expanded Universal Jurisdiction to Prosecute Human
Rights Abuses in Latin America, China, and Beyond, 35 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 495,504-
05 (2007).
139. Id.
140. Id.
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value outside of Argentina. 1 ' Moreover, the Court ruled that
amnesty provided it with an affirmative justification to exercise
jurisdiction, as its existence proved that that no court in Argentina
would be able to prosecute the crimes. "'
While the Spanish Supreme Court's decision in Scilingo
determined that an amnesty enacted abroad would not bar an
individual's subsequent prosecution for covered offenses in Spain,
it did not determine whether Spain would similarly exercise its
jurisdiction in response to other transitional justice mechanisms.
For example, under Spanish law, a court can decline to prosecute
an individual if he has been "punished" abroad, leaving some
doubt as to how a Spanish court would respond if an individual
brought before the court had been awarded a dramatically reduced
sentence (or one ordering community service) by the courts of the
country in which his offenses were committed. 143
Despite these ambiguities, the clear articulation by the
Spanish courts that amnesties for crimes other than those treaty-
based crimes giving rise to a clear international duty to prosecute
will not be enforced outside the issuing territory is significant.
Moreover, the decision demonstrated that Spanish courts appear
to consider the availability of an alternative forum in which
investigation or prosecution can be held as a predicate
consideration, -if not a requirement, to a finding of non-
justiciability in Spain.
D. France
Although France only recognizes universal jurisdiction over
claims of torture,'" its highest court has exercised this power in at
least one case - that of Ely Ould Dah. Ould Dah, an Army
Captain in Mauritius, was accused of ordering and participating in
the arrest and torture of two Mauritanian soldiers as part of a
government-sponsored crackdown against thousands of African
Mauritanians accused of plotting a conspiracy. "' Two of his victims
141. Id. at 505 (citing STS, (J.T.S., No. 1362) § 11 (2004)).
142. Audiencia Nacional, Apr. 19, 2005 (R.G.D., No. 16/2005, at Part III, § 6).
143. Human Rights Watch, supra note104, at 25-26.
144. CODE DE PROCEDURE PENALE [C. PR. PlN.] art. 689 (Fr.) (providing for
universal jurisdiction over offenses committed outside of France when an international
convention gives jurisdiction to French courts to deal with this offense and referring only
to the Torture Convention as an available basis). -
145. Trial Watch, Ely Ould Dah, http://www.trial-ch.org/en/trial-
watch/profile/db/facts/ely-ould-had_266.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2009).
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had fled to France, where they became political refugees, and filed
a private criminal complaint with the French courts. Ould Dah
was arrested in July 1999, in France, while there for a training
program. 147 However, the French authorities released him into
house arrest in September 1999, and by April 2000, he had escaped
back to Mauritania. 148 Thereafter, a French examining magistrate
ordered that Ould Dah be tried in absentia before the Cour
d'assises of Nimes, a decision that was confirmed by that court. "9
Ould Dah appealed the decision, arguing that the courts
should refrain from exercising jurisdiction over him on the basis of
an amnesty issued by the government of Mauritius relieving all
state actors from liability in connection with the government
crackdown. 10 The Appeals Court of Nimes flatly rejected Ould
Dah's claims, holding that the foreign amnesty was valid only in
the territory of the issuing state, and that if France were to afford
it recognition, France would violate its own international
obligations and abnegate the very principle and purpose of
universal jurisdiction. "5 Following the Cour de Cassation's
decision, in 2005, the Cour d'assises of Nimes finally tried Ould
Dah in absentia on charges of torture in violation of the Torture
Convention, found him liable on the charges of directly
participating in torture, and sentenced him to the maximum
available Pefialty of ten years in prison. 152
The case of Ely Ould Dah in France demonstrates that while
France may have unnecessarily narrowed the scope of universal
jurisdiction, it has recognized that, at least in the case of torture,
courts may not dismiss claims on non-justiciability grounds, even
where the defendant has been granted amnesty by his home state.
E. Denmark
Danish law provides for the exercise of universal jurisdiction
over offenses listed in treaties to which Denmark is a party that
also contain an international obligation to prosecute or extradite,
including torture and grave breaches of the Geneva
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Human Rights Watch, supra note 104, at 58.
152. Trial Watch, supra note 145.
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Conventions. 1' Denmark's Pefial Code also gives Denmark
jurisdiction over any crime carrying a Pefialty of more than one
year of imprisonment if it is also a crime in the territorial state and
the accused cannot be extradited there. " According to Human
Rights Watch, Danish authorities have investigated several
complaints on this basis since 2001, three of which had led to a
prosecution. 155
However, Danish prosecutors admittedly take amnesties
issued in the territorial state into account when deciding whether
to exercise universal jurisdiction. According to Human Rights
Watch, the Danish Special International Crimes Office (SICO)
declined to investigate at least three cases involving international
crimes committed during the Lebanese civil war on the basis of an
amnesty law issued by the Lebanese government in 1991. '56
Apparently, SICO applies a list of criteria to each amnesty in
order to determine whether it will be afforded comity. Because all
of the amnesties that SICO has considered have been "general" -
applying to both sides of a conflict rather than one - SICO has
never "disqualified" an amnesty for comity purposes. "'
As discussed in the context of the Pinochet decisions,
Denmark's willingness to apply the non-justiciability doctrine of
international comity likely contravenes its international legal
obligations under the related treaties. 158 Moreover, while it is
encouraging that SICO applies a principled list of criteria to
amnesties in order to determine whether they are appropriate
subjects of international comity, the criteria apparently do not take
the substantive nature of the alleged offenses into account. Finally,
the risk that prosecutorial discretion could be based on political
rather than legal considerations is extremely high, given the
unwillingness of SICO to actually disclose the list on which it
makes its comity evaluations.
153. STRAFFELOVEN [PE$4APER.AL CODE] § 8(5) (Den.).
154. Id. § 8(6).
155. Human Rights Watch, supra note 104, at 46.
156. Id. at 25.
157. Id. at 26.
158. In order to apply the doctrine of non-justiciability and decline jurisdiction over
the offenses of genocide, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, and torture,
Denmark's international legal obligations will likely be contravened.
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F. United States
In the last twenty five years, the courts of the United States,
with some support from Congress and the Supreme Court, have
interpreted the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, to
provide extraterritorial and universal jurisdiction over crimes
prohibited under international law when raised pursuant to a civil
claim bought by an alien. ' A recent amendment to the ATS
known as the Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA) provides a
cause of action for U.S. nationals, as well as aliens, for torture and
extrajudicial executions. " The Supreme Court confirmed in its
2005 decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain that the ATS permits
suits for offenses that violate international norms recognized at the
time of the statute's enactment in 1789 (including piracy) as well as
for causes of action that have entered the modern law of nations
since that time. 161 Courts have interpreted the ATS to permit
claims alleging violations of the law of war, crimes against
humanity, genocide, and torture, among other offenses, often in
the absence of any internationally-recognized jurisdictional basis
other than universal jurisdiction. 162 Several claims brought under
the ATS have implicated amnesties enacted in the territorial state
of the offense. However, the courts that have considered the issue
have dealt with those amnesties in strikingly different ways.
1. Disregarding the Amnesty
In the course of adjudicating claims brought pursuant to the
ATS, several U.S. courts have mentioned that the territorial state
has enacted an amnesty but pay no further regard to it thereafter.
For example, in Barrueto v. Larios, the family of a Chilean
159. Although the practice of recognizing universal civil jurisdiction is less common
among States than that of recognizing universal criminal jurisdiction, according to the
Restatement, it is nevertheless a legitimate exercise of State power. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATION LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404, comment b (1987)
("In general, jurisdiction on the basis of universal interests has been exercised in the form
of criminal law, but international law does not preclude the application of non-criminal
law on this basis .... ).
160. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, § 1350, 106 Stat. 73
(1992).
161. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
162. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 241 (2d Cir. 1995); Doe v. Islamic Salvation Front,
993 F. Supp. 3d 8 (D.D.C. 1998); Filartiga v. PefiaPefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
Note that U.S. courts must also satisfy the U.S. Constitution's requirements for exercising
personal and subject matter jurisdiction in ATS cases.
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economist, killed by Pinochet's military officers under Pinochet's
command, sued one of the military officers who had been present
at his execution and subsequently relocated to the United States.
under the ATS and TVPA for extrajudicial killing, torture, crimes
against humanity, and cruel and degrading treatment. 163 Despite
the fact that Larios was purportedly covered by the Chilean
amnesty at issue in the Pinochet case, the District Court denied his
motion to dismiss the case without discussing any potential
international comity concerns. " A jury went on to find in favor of
the plaintiffs, and the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed, again without any. detailed consideration of the
amnesty.165
Similarly, in Arce .v. Garcia, three Salvadoran plaintiffs
brought claims under the ATS and TVPA against two retired
Salvadoran generals living in Southern Florida. 166 Neither the
Southern District of Florida nor the Eleventh Circuit mentioned
the El Salvadoran amnesty even in passing in their decisions. 161
Although it does not appear that the defendants attempted to raise
amnesty as a defense, the omission is still noteworthy as a federal
court has an obligation to satisfy its subject matter jurisdiction sua
sponte. 168
2. Amnesty Not a Bar to Exercise of Jurisdiction
Additionally, several U.S. courts considering ATS cases have
evaluated the claims of defendants who have argued that suits
against them should be dismissed on the basis of amnesties
enacted elsewhere, but have rejected their claims.
For example, in 2003, a group of Salvadorans brought claims
under the ATS and TVPA against Colonel Nicolas Carranza, a
naturalized U.S. citizen living in Memphis. 169 They alleged that as
163. Barrueto v. Larios (Barrueto I), 205 F. Supp. 2d 1325 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
164. Id.
165. Barrueto v. Larios, 402 F.3d 1148 (llth Cir. 2005).
166. Arce v. Garcia, No. 02-14427 (11th Cir. 2005), available at
http://www.cja.org/cases/Romagoza-Docs/AppellateDecision%202.28.5.pdf. The Eleventh
Circuit additionally upheld the three plaintiffs' jury award for $54.6 million in
compensatory and punitive damages.
167. Id.
168. See id. at 6 ("Before we evaluate these claims, we must determine whether we
have jurisdiction because courts have a duty to consider their subject-matter jurisdiction
sua sponte."), citing TVA v. Whitman, 336 F.3d 1236, 1257 n.34 (11th Cir. 2003).
.169. Chavez v. Carranza, No. 03-2932, 2005 WL 2659186, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. 2005).
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El Salvador's Vice-Minister of Defense from 1979-1981, Carranza
bore responsibility for the extrajudicial killings and torture of the
individuals and members of their immediate families committed by
the Salvadoran security forces. 70 Unlike in Barrueto and Arce, the
defendant in Carranza moved for summary judgment on the
grounds that the plaintiffs' claims were barred by Salvadoran
amnesty law, one that U.S. courts were obligated to recognize. 7' In
considering his motion, the court considered the broad scope and
unconditional and general nature of the amnesty, as well as the
treatment of the amnesty law by the Salvadoran government
(upholding its constitutionality and refusing prosecutions on two
separate occasions). 172 After engaging in a careful analysis under
the international comity doctrine, the court found that Supreme
Court precedent required an actual conflict between domestic and
foreign law before the doctrine of comity could apply. 173 The court
concluded that because it was possible for persons regulated by the
laws of both El Salvador and the United States to comply with
both, the doctrine of comity was inapplicable. 174
Additionally, the Court in Carranza pointed to a situation
where the international comity doctrine might allow U.S. courts to
withhold jurisdiction based on an amnesty or other transitional
justice mechanism enacted abroad. In that case, Sarei v. Rio Tinto,
PLC, 175 citizens of Papua New Guinea had filed ATS claims
against the most powerful active mining conglomerate in the
country, accusing it of aiding and abetting genocide and war crimes
committed by the govenrment, among other offenses. 176 However,
the government of Papua New Guinea had passed a law
prohibiting citizens from filing claims involving foreign mining
projects in foreign courts. "' The Carranza court speculated thatthis sort of law might give rise to the conflict of laws required to
170. Id.
171. Id. at *1-2.
172. Id. at *3-4.
173. Id. at *4.
174. Id. (finding, "El Salvador's amnesty law cannot be construed to prohibit legal
claims filed outside El Salvador . . . Application of the ATS or TVPA in United States
federal court does not interfere with the application of the Salvadoran amnesty law.
Similarly, Plaintiffs may be barred from filing suit in El Salvador, but they are not barred
from filing suit under United States law.").
175. Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
176. Id. at 1121.
177. Id. at 1201.
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trigger the applicability of the doctrine of international comity. 178
Following his conviction in a subsequent jury trial, 79 Carranza
appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, alleging in
part that the District Court should have found that the Salvadoran
amnesty law was a bar to the plaintiffs' claims against him. '8 The
Sixth Circuit quickly dispensed with Carranza's claim, finding that
an actual conflict between Salvadoran and American law would
have to exist in order for the doctrine of international comity to be
applicable, and that no conflict existed because the Salvadoran
Amnesty law did not apply extraterritorially and because it was
possible for both the plaintiffs and Carranza to comply with both
countries' laws simultaneously. 181
At the same time that the Carranza case was filed in the
Tennessee District Courts, another Salvadoran plaintiff brought an
action under the ATS and TVPA in the Eastern District of
California. 182 The plaintiff alleged that Alvaro Rafeal Saravia, a
current resident of Modesto, California and the former chief of
security for the organizer of El Salvadoran paramilitary groups,
had been complicit in the assassination of the well-known civilian
leader Archbishop Oscar Romero and had incurred liability for
extrajudicial execution and crimes against humanity under the
ATS and TVPA. 183 Interestingly, Saravia had been under
indictment in El Salvador for the murder of Archbishop Romero
at the time that the amnesty law was enacted. "8 After the amnesty
law was issued, the judge dismissed the case against him, finding
that the amnesty, which extinguished all liability for political
crimes, applied to the assassination. 185 That decision was upheld by
178. However, even acknowledging that the law at issue in Rio Tinto the Carranza
Court declared the doctrine of international comity inapplicable to all claims brought
under the TVPA and the ATS in the wake of Congress's clear decision to open U.S. courts
to claims of that nature. Carranza, 2005 WL 2659186, at *5 ("the doctrine of comity is only
relevant in the absence of contrary congressional direction; it has 'no application' where
Congress has spoken on the issue"); see Maxwell Commc'n Corp. v. Societe Generale (In
re Maxwell Commc'n Corp.), 93 F.3d 1036, 1049 (2d Cir. 1996)).
179. Carranza was found guilty of torture, extrajudicial killing, crimes against
humanity and liable to each of four plaintiffs for $500,000 in compensatory damages and
$1 million in punitive damages. Chavez v. Carranza, 559 F.3d 486, 491 (6th Cir. 2009).
180. Id. at 494.
181. Id. at 495 (finding in part that Salvadoran law did not bar plaintiffs from suing
Carranza in the United States).
182. Doe v. Saravia, 348 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1118 (E.D. Cal. 2004).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1130.
185. Id. at 1133.
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the First Criminal Chamber of El Salvador in 1993, where the
court held that its decision had res judicata effect with regard to
Saravia. "
Rather than suggest that the Salvadoran amnesty and judicial
decisions were entitled to international comity, the court in Doe v.
Saravia held that the amnesty actually allowed the plaintiffs to
satisfy the "exhaustion of domestic remedies" requirement of the
TVPA. 1" El Salvadoran law would prevent the plaintiffs from
publicly or privately pursuing justice in El Salvador. 18 The Court
further held that Saravia was liable under the ATS for
extrajudicial killing and crimes against humanity, and awarded the
plaintiff $5 million in compensatory damages and $5 million in
punitive damages. 189
Finally, in the recent series of decisions in the Apartheid
Litigation, three judges - two judges of the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals and District Judge Scheindlin - declined to dismiss
actions against the multinational corporate defendants on the basis
of the objections of the South African government and the TRC
process previously undertaken in South Africa in the wake of
Apartheid. In the Second Circuit case, which was decided under
the name Khulumani, Judges Katzmann and Hall reversed the
District Court's decision to dismiss the case and then remanded it
to the District Court for consideration of the justiciability of the
plaintiffs' claims. 190 Judge Scheindlin, in turn, based her analysis of
the effect of the TRC process on the plaintiffs' claims according to
a classic interpretation of the doctrine of international comity in
the United States, under which "a true conflict" must exist
between the laws of a foreign jurisdiction and the United States. 19
In determining whether litigation against the corporate
defendants in the Apartheid Litigation under the ATS in the U.S.
courts constituted a "true conflict" with the TRC process in South
Africa, Judge Scheindlin analyzed the degree to which the
corporate defendants' actions had been previously addressed by
the TRC process and the legal effect of the TRC on the plaintiffs'.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1153.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1159.
190. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 260-61 (2d Cir. 2007).
191. In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228,283 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
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claims against the corporations in South Africa. " Judge Scheindlin
found, first, that the TRC process had not been exclusive and that
where the TRC did not grant an individual amnesty, the individual
could still be subjected to civil and/or criminal proceedings. 193 The
corporate defendants in the case had not appeared before the
TRC, nor had they been granted amnesty by it. 94 Thus, she found
that no conflict existed between the TRC process and litigation
against the corporate defendants in the U.S. courts. 195
Secondly, Judge Scheindlin considered whether the doctrine
of international comity would have been triggered even if there
was a true conflict between U.S. law and the TRC process. Judge
Scheindlin first noted that a court should ordinarily consider
whether an adequate forum exists in the objecting nation and
whether the defendant was subject to jurisdiction in the foreign
forum before applying the doctrine of international comity.'96
However, she acknowledged that in extreme cases in which a
foreign sovereign's interests were affronted by the conduct of
litigation in a U.S. forum, dismissal might be warranted even if the
defendant was not amenable to suit elsewhere. 197 However, in
analyzing the specific claim before her, she found both that no
alternative forum for the plaintiffs' claims existed in South Africa
and that as litigation in the U.S. did not conflict with the goals of
the TRC process, the case was not an "extreme" one in which the
plaintiffs' claims could be dismissed even in the absence of such an
alternative forum.198 Thus, Judge Scheindlin upheld her court's
jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims.
3. Amnesty as a Bar to Exercise of Jurisdiction
As noted above, in a vigorous dissent in the Second Circuit's
decision on the Apartheid-era ATS claims, Judge Korman echoed
the calls of Lord Lloyd of Berwick in the Pinochet case and
implored the District Court to decline to exercise jurisdiction over
the case on the basis of a broadly articulated non-justiciability
192. Id. at 285.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 283 (citing Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153, 160 (2d Cir. 1998)).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 285-86.
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doctrine. ' Judge Korman argued that any inquiry by a U.S. court
into the potential effect of U.S. litigation on South African
political dynamics would be completely inappropriate:
[I]t is only for the South African government, through its
elected representatives, to say whether this litigation conflicts
with its policies, just as it earlier decided for the same reasons to
reject the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's
recommendation that a once-off wealth tax be imposed on all
corporations. Surely this is not a dispute for a United States
district judge to resolve. Yet, the majority contemplates a
remand that would subject a foreign democratic nation to the
indignity of having to defend policy judgments that have been
entrusted to it by a free people against an attack by private
citizens and organizations who have lost the political battle at
home. This dispute is not the business of the Judicial Branch of
the United States. 200
However, aside from Judge Korman's isolated expression of
hostility to the notion that a U.S. court would adjudicate claims
purportedly addressed by a territorial state that declined
prosecution of crimes under international law, 0' U.S. courts have
been generally receptive to the prospect of exercising jurisdiction
to hold such individuals accountable for their offenses. 20 However,
U.S. courts have been hesitant to adjudicate one particular
category of ATS and TVPA claims: those which would require
U.S. courts to decline to recognize amnesty law and other
transitional justice mechanisms facilitated or previously supported
by the United States or to which the United States is a party. In
these types of cases, the courts have found the political question
and comity doctrines far more appealing, although on slightly
muddled grounds. 03
For example, in In re Nazi Era Cases Against German
Defendants Litigation, a New Jersey District Court found that it
lacked competence to adjudicate the plaintiffs' ATS claims
brought against corporations that aided and abetted the Nazi
government during the Holocaust era. " In the wake of World War
199. See Khulumani. at 156 (Korman, J., dissenting).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Supra, Parts 1II.F.a-b.
203. In re Nazi Era Cases Against German Defendants Litigation, 129 F. Supp. 2d 370
(D.N.J. 2001).
204. Id. at 371-72.
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II, the U.S. government had entered into a Foundation Agreement
with Germany, choosing to provide reparations to victims rather
than letting individual plaintiffs bring actions against those who
supported the Nazi regime's egregrious policies. The Agreement
also intended to restore the German economy, thus ensuring that
Germany could better withstand the alternative ideology offered
by the Soviet Union. 205 The Nazi Era Cases court found that the
Agreement did not extinguish any legal claims, but rather
"facilitate[d] an agreement between victims, German Industry, and
German government" intended to "bring expeditious justice to the
widest possible population of survivors, and to help facilitate legal
peace." 2 Additionally, the court emphasized the Statement of
Interest (SOI) filed by the United States which, while not binding,
asked the court to treat the Foundation as the plaintiffs' exclusive
remedy for Nazi-era claims and to dismiss their case in response.207
However, the court eventually determined that all of the plaintiffs'
claims should be pursued through the Foundation instead of the
courts, as the political question doctrine counseled for dismissal of
the case. 0 Specifically, the court found that allowing the action to
proceed in the face of executive disapproval would express a lack
of respect due to the coordinate branches of government and
could potentially embarrass the country through "multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question." 20,
The court similarly determined that the Nazi-era cases were
non-justiciable on the basis of the doctrine of international comity.
In determining whether to lend effect to the German Foundation
Law, an enactment of another country, the court found that it
would consider "whether giving effect to a foreign judicial act
would be prejudicial to the interests of the United States." 210 It also
found that the "true conflict" requirement for a comity inquiry had
been met because German Foundation Law would only function if
all pending litigation in the United States ceased. 21
In determining whether it had the authority to challenge the
validity of the German Foundation law, the court in Nazi Era
205. Id. at 376.
206. Id. at 380.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 388-89.
209. Id. at 382.
210. Id. at 387.
211. Id.
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Cases found that "United States courts ordinarily refuse to review
acts of foreign governments, and instead defer to proceedings
taking place in foreign countries, allowing those acts and
proceedings to have extraterritorial effect in the United States." 212
It held that it was "not in a position to question whether the
payment structure under the German Foundation Law [was]
adequate or legal," as such an evaluation would need to be made
by either the German courts or through diplomatic channels, and
the German courts had already determined that the law was
constitutional. 213 This component of the court's reasoning departed
dramatically from the international comity inquiry generally
followed by other U.S. courts, and appears to have conflated the
doctrine of international comity with the act of state doctrine. 214
Because the court's holding under the political question
doctrine was sound, its misapplication of the doctrine of
international comity had no real bearing on the outcome of the
case. However, the cases that the court relied upon appear to
preserve the doctrine for applicability to future cases. For instance,
the court held that U.S. courts ordinarily allow the acts of foreign
governments "to have extraterritorial effect in the United
States." 215 The court also indicated that comity might be extended
to foreign proceedings when doing so would not be contrary to the
interests of the United States. 216
In evaluating the significance of the court's holding in Nazi
Era Cases to cases involving transitional justice mechanisms more
broadly, it is critical to note the significant involvement of the
United States in the negotiation and implementation of the
German Foundation Agreement. Despite repeatedly emphasizing
that the SOI submitted by the executive branch was not binding on
212. Id. (citing Pravin Banker Assoc., Ltd., v. Banco Popular Del Peru, 109 F.3d 850,
854 (2d Cir.1997)).
213. Id. at 388.
214. See generally In re Nazi Era Cases, 129 F. Supp. 2d 370.
(while the Act of State doctrine precludes the courts from declaring the Act of another
sovereign invalid, the court in Nazi Era Cases was not asked to find the German
Foundation Law invalid, but to find that it would not be unreasonable for the United
States to apply its own law (the ATS) to adjudicate the plaintiffs' claims. As the
Foundation agreement, a German public enactment, had no legal effect outside its own
borders, finding the ATS applicable would not necessarily have required the court to find
that the Foundation law was somehow invalid.).
215. In re Nazi Era Cases, 129 F. Supp 2d at 387 (citing Pravin Banker, 109 F.3d at
854).
216. Pravin Banker, 109 F.3d at 854.
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its decision, the court's opinion failed to inquire about America's
interest in the adjudications. In particular, there is no mention of
the place of the ATS in the hierarchy of American policies
relevant to the case. Rather, the court appears to have assumed
that the SOI submitted by the executive was conclusive authority
on the nature of America's interest in the cases.
These U.S. cases reveal that while courts generally refuse to
apply amnesty laws of other countries, they typically consider non-
justiciability doctrines to be applicable, subject to some threshold
requirements. However, beyond these common themes,
justiciability inquiries appear widely scattered. It is particularly
noteworthy that none of the courts have distinguished between
claims arising from treaties as opposed to customary international
law under the ATS and TVPA. Some courts have not mentioned
the potential for non-justiciability at all. Some, such as Judge
Korman, have considered the doctrine automatically applicable,
while others have insisted on first recognizing a "true conflict."
Once the courts proceed to an examination of justiciability, their
findings have been even less clear. While all the courts appear to
have engaged in some sort of "interest balancing," the roles of the
Executive and Congress in articulating that interest appear to be
uncertain, as does the process of determining the interest of the
foreign state. Moreover, one court has emphasized that the
availability of an alternative forum is a predicate to finding the
doctrine of international comity available, while another has
determined that the mere presence of the ATS means that comity
is unavailable altogether. 217
G. Conclusion
Although the frequency with which courts in the United
217. See Ungaro-Benages v. Dresdner Bank AG, 379 F.3d 1227, 1236 (11th Cir. 2004);
Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153, 160 (2d Cir. 1998) ("When a court dismisses on the
ground of comity, it should normally consider whether an adequate forum exists in the
objecting nation."); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy Inc., 2005 WL
2082846, at *7 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 30, 2005) ("the adequacy of the forum is a prerequisite to
applying the international comity doctrine").
217. See Ungaro-Benages v. Dresdner Bank AG, 379 F.3d 1227, 1236 (11th Cir. 2004);
Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153, 160 (2d Cir. 1998) ("When a court dismisses on the
ground of comity, it should normally consider whether an adequate forum exists in the
objecting nation."); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy Inc., 2005 WL
2082846, at *7 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 30, 2005) ("the adequacy of the forum is a prerequisite to
applying the international comity doctrine").
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States and Europe exercise extraterritorial and universal
jurisdiction to adjudicate alleged violations of international
criminal law has increased, there is still no systematic approach to
adjudication of such claims. This lack of clarity undermines the
very body of international law from which the courts derive their
authority. Furthermore, existing legal principles recognized by all
of the judicial systems provide a reasonably clear framework in
which courts and prosecutors can determine justiciability of claims
without succumbing to purely power-based considerations. The
following section of this paper will seek to assist courts in
upholding the rule of law in situations where they are most at risk
of being undermined by the rule of men.
IV. THE OBLIGATION TO RESPECT: A PRINCIPLED STRATEGY FOR
DECLINING TO EXERCISE EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION IN
THE WAKE OF TRANSITION
A. Introduction
As demonstrated in the preceding sections, it is very likely
that states other than those in which an offense that violates
international criminal law occurs have a mandatory obligation to
exercise jurisdiction over acts such as genocide, grave breaches of
the Geneva Conventions, and torture. Additionally, there is strong
evidence suggesting that third-party states are merely permitted,
although not obligated, to exercise jurisdiction over crimes against
humanity, war crimes committed in the context of an internal-
armed conflict, and other offenses recognized under international
law. Under these circumstances, the courts of a variety of nations
have sharply disagreed on the proper approach to take in
considering whether or not to exercise their jurisdiction.
This lack of clarity218 has at least two negative consequences
for the international law that such extraterritorial jurisdiction is
intended to bolster. First, by engaging in an unprincipled approach
to adjudication of claims regarding genocide, torture, and grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions, third-party states threaten to
breach their own international obligations to hold perpetrators of
those offenses accountable. 219 Moreover, in deferring to amnesties
218. In Europe, which exercises criminal jurisdiction, prosecutorial discretion plays
much the same role as the non-justiciability doctrines in American courts, which apply
extraterritorial civil jurisdiction under the ATS and TVPA.
219. Scharf, supra note 53, at 513.
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(or solely reparations in the case of the German Foundation
Agreement) for any situation other than those in which the law
clearly provides courts with a reason to do so, the courts of third-
party states undermine the fragile rule that currently exists in the
international sphere. As Martti Koshinniemi emphasized, "[t]he
universalization of the Rule of Law calls for the realization of
criminal responsibility in the international as in the domestic
sphere. In the liberal view, there should be no outside-of-law;
everyone, regardless of place of activity or formal position, should
be accountable for their deeds.""22  Amnesties and other
exculpatory mechanisms are the extreme manifestation of "the
rule of men," as they "represent an attempt to trump the
application of rules of law."" In doing so, Richard Goldstone has
argued that they "constitute a threat to both the legitimacy and
fairness of the rules,"222 and Michael Scharf has concurred that
they "breed contempt for the law and encourage future
violations," whether or not they are paired with conditions short of
prosecution. " Insofar as the courts and prosecutors of third-party
states derive their authority to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction
from international law, they should make every effort to avoid
undermining that very body of law when they abstain from
applying it.
This section will examine the various legal doctrines under
which states may decline to exercise jurisdiction, such as when the
state where the offense took place has enacted an amnesty or
other transitional justice mechanism short of prosecution that
purports to extinguish perpetrators' liability for that second
category of offenses. Additionally, it will illustrate specific
guidelines that courts can use to determine whether they have a
justifiable legal basis for declining to adjudicate claims implicating
an amnesty or other transitional justice mechanism. In basing their
decisions on such principled grounds, national courts can provide
their most critical benefit to international law and mitigate the
ability powerful actors have to award themselves with impunity for
the very offenses which international law most strenuously seeks
to deter.
220. Martti Koskenniemi, Between Impunity and Show Trials, 2002 MAX PLANCK Y.B.
U.N. L., at 2.
221. See Sadat, supra note 22.
222. Id.
223. Scharf, supra note 53, at 513-14.
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B. Inquiry #1: Predicate Inquires-Choice of Law, the Act of State
Doctrine, and Exhaustion of Local Remedies
1. Domestic Amnesties are not Enforceable Outside the Enacting
State.
One of the oldest principles of international law is the "public
law taboo," otherwise known as the "revenue rule," in which the
courts of one sovereign refuse to "take notice" or "enforce" the
public laws of another. "2 Dating from 18th-century England, " the
rule reinforces the concept that while states may be free to enact
certain laws (even, perhaps amnesties extinguishing liability for
crimes against humanity, some war crimes, and other offenses)
within their own territories, other sovereigns are not obligated to
give effect to expressions of their counterparts' national interest.
Thus, it is imperative that third-party states exercising
extraterritorial and universal jurisdiction first recognize that
domestic amnesty laws only bar prosecutions within the states that
enact them. "
2. The Act of State Doctrine Does Not Bar a Court's Exercise of
Extraterritorial or Universal Jurisdiction Simply Because the
Territorial State Has Enacted an Amnesty.
As demonstrated in Nazi Era Cases, courts occasionally
assume that if they attempt to adjudicate the liability of an
amnesty beneficiary, they will effectively declare the foreign
amnesty invalid and in contravention of the state doctrine act,
according to which "the courts of one country will not sit in
judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its
own territory." 12 However, in exercising extraterritorial
224. Sadat, supra note 22, at 208 ("many states refuse to enforce foreign public law and
would consider criminal proceedings as well as amnesty laws 'public,' applying what one
writer has dubbed the 'public lIw taboo').
225. See Holman v. Johnson, 1 COWP 341 (K.B. 1775); see also Pasquantino v. United
States, 544 U.S. 349 (2005).
226. See, e.g., Diane F. Orentlicher, Striking a Balance: Mixed Law Tribunals and
Conflicts of Jurisdiction, in JUSTICE FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 234 (Mark
Lattimer & Philippe Sands eds., Hart Publ'g 2003) ("As a matter of international law,
states generally are not required to give extra-territorial effect to another state's amnesty
law. The state that enacts an amnesty is exercising only its own prescriptive jurisdiction; it
is not enacting international law. When the amnesty covers crimes that are subject to
universal jurisdiction, other states would remain free to apply their own law to the conduct
at issue.").
227. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
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jurisdiction over a claim arising in another state, the third-party
state does not challenge the legality of the amnesty issued in the
territorial state; it merely asserts that it too has. the power to
exercise its jurisdiction over the conduct giving rise to the
offense. 2' The Act of State doctrine is triggered in the context of
such a case, if at all,'2 when a defendant argues that his alleged
substantive offense was connected to a legitimate public policy
decision of the territorial state. 230 To the extent that courts rely on
precedent under the act of state doctrine in dealing with the effect
of an amnesty or other transitional justice mechanism on the
justiciability of a claim, they are in error.
3. Domestic Amnesties Satisfy Any Exhaustion of Local
Remedies Requirement
Finally, some laws and doctrines articulated by the courts of
certain states require that plaintiffs exhaust available local
remedies in the country where their claims arose before they
petition third-party courts to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction
over claims arising under international law. "3 Under international
law, however, claimants need only resort to such local remedies
that are "available" and potentially "effective" before they may
228. Three conditions must be met for a court to find that a claim is barred by the
doctrine, namely: (1) an official act of a foreign sovereign, (2) performed within its own
territory, and (3) a claim seeking relief that would require the court to declare the foreign
sovereign's act invalid. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp. Int'l., 493 U.S.
400 (1990).
229. There is some controversy over whether the Act of State doctrine is applicable at
all in the context of cases involving offenses under international-level offenses, particularly
those rising to the level of violations of jus cogens norms.
230. See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2007) (Defendants alleged that
because the operations of a mining company were memorialized in an official act of the
Papua New Guinea government, any attempt to adjudicate claims that the company
committed systematic racial discrimination and environmental pollution in violation of
international law would run afoul of the Act of State Doctrine, because it would call the
sovereign acts of the PNG government into question.).
231. See Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 ("A court shall decline to hear a claim
under this section if the claimant has not exhausted adequate and available remedies in
the place in which the conduct giving rise to the claim occurred."). In 2008, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that "ATS claims are appropriately considered for
exhaustion under both domestic prudential standards and core principles of international
law ... [w]here the 'nexus' to the United States is weak," particularly "with respect to
claims that do not involve matters of 'universal concern."' Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 550
F.3d 822, 824 (9th Cir. 2008). See also Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877 (7th Cir. 2005).
Other U.S. courts have thus far declined to require plaintiffs to "exhaust" local remedies
in ATS cases.
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take their claims elsewhere. Courts determining whether local
remedies are likely to be effective may consider whether there has
been an unreasonable delay in local proceedings, whether pursuing
local remedies would be futile, and whether the claimant actually
has access to an effective remedy under the territorial state's
laws. 2" As the court in Saravia correctly held, the presence of an
amnesty in the territorial state proves that local remedies are
unavailable, and thus that the exhaustion of remedies requirement
has been satisfied. 23
C. Inquiry #2: Applicability of the International Comity and
Abstention Doctrines
The non-justiciability doctrine most frequently invoked in
extraterritorial jurisdiction cases over offenses committed in a
state that later enacted an amnesty or other transitional justice
measure short of prosecution is that of international comity.
Dating back to 16th-century Europe, the doctrine was imported
into English common law by Lord Mansfield in the 18th century,
and later into American common law by Justice Story. ' The U.S.
Supreme Court described the doctrine as "the recognition which
one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or
judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to
international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own
citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its
laws," 235 and "the spirit of cooperation in which a domestic tribunal
approaches the resolution of cases touching the laws and interests
of other sovereign states." 1 6 The doctrine is not obligatory on
courts, but is rather a discretionary rule of "practice, convenience,
and expediency," " which allows them to grant "voluntary
232. ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
306, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (July 26, 2001).
233. Id. at 1153. See also Emeka Duruigbo, Exhaustion of Local Remedies in Alien
Tort Litigation: Implications for International Human Rights Protection, 29 Fordham Int'l
L.J. 1245, 1264 (2006) (citing the Permanent Court of International Justice's Panevezys-
Saldutskis Railway case ("There can be no need to resort to the municipal courts if those
courts have no jurisdiction to afford relief .... )).
234. See JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Altos Hornos de Mexico, S.A. de C.V., 412 F.3d
418, 423-24 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Somerset v. Stewart, 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (1772)); JOSEPH
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICr OF LAWS § 35 (8th ed. 1883).
235. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895).
236. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct. S.D. Iowa, 482 U.S.
522, 544 (1987).
237. Pravin Banker Assoc., Ltd., v. Banco Popular Del Peru, 109 F.3d 850, 854 (2d
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deference to the acts of other governments. 238 Normally, courts
employ the comity doctrine in order to dismiss a case in favor of a
foreign court's judicial pronouncement or proceeding regarding
the same case. 9 However, at least one Supreme Court Justice has
argued that the doctrine is relevant in ATS cases as well. 20 The
doctrine is notoriously ill-defined at its margins, and thus it poses
the greatest risk of allowing impermissible political considerations
to trump the rule of law. The following principles are intended to
assist courts in navigating this doctrine while remaining as faithful
to the dictates of the law as possible.
1. The Doctrine of International Comity is not Applicable to
Treaty-Based Claims Giving Rise to an International Duty to
Prosecute.
Certain international treaties (which have entered customary
international law) give rise to an affirmative obligation on the part
of third-party states to exercise jurisdiction over individuals
accused of genocide, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions,
and torture. 241 These international treaties and customary
international law render the doctrine of international comity
incompatible with a state's international law obligations, because a
state has a mandatory obligation under international law to
exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over these offenses, and not
merely a permissive right to do so. For example, if the
prosecutorial authorities in Denmark refrain from exercising
jurisdiction on comity grounds when doing so would conflict with a
domestic amnesty as a matter of policy, these authorities may
bring Denmark in violation of its international obligations under
the Genocide, Torture, and Geneva Conventions. Similarly, in the
United States, the ATS may authorize causes of action that derive
'from universally recognized and specific international law norms
that are binding on the United States. The ATS may also
incorporate the specific international duty to hold the perpetrators
Cir.1997).
238. 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4473 (1981).
239. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 344
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
240. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692,761 (2004).
241. See generally Genocide Convention, supra note 55; see also Torture Convention,
supra note 57.
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of that specific category of crimes accountable. It would be
fundamentally paradoxical to suggest that a court should make a
discretionary decision to dismiss such a claim on comity grounds,
thereby subverting a legal norm established by international law. 242
Thus, courts exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction should seriously
consider finding the doctrine of international comity inapplicable
in situations in which they are adjudicating claims alleging
genocide, torture, or grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.
2. The Doctrine of International Comity is Not Applicable If the
Law of the Forum State Strongly Favors Adjudication or If the
Forum Finds the Particular Amnesty Repugnant to its Public
Policy.
Even if a court is contemplating exercising jurisdiction over
offenses other than those involving an international duty to
prosecute (such as crimes against humanity, war crimes committed
during an internal armed conflict, and extrajudicial executions),
there may be other policies of the third-party state that mitigate
against the doctrine of international comity. As the Second Circuit
recently explained in JP Morgan Chase Bank, the doctrine of
international comity, as originally applied in England and the
United States, was not to be extended in a way that would
contradict the law or policy of the forum state.243 While Lord
Mansfield refused to apply the comity doctrine where it would
oblige England to return an American-owned slave to his
purported owners,2" Story described Lord Mansfield's refusal as
allowing the doctrine to provide free and slave states with a
"principled way to accommodate (and, if necessary, avoid) the law
of the others." 245
242. This is particularly true given that U.S. courts typically interpret statutes -
including the ATS - according to the "Charming Betsy canon," which states that "an act of
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains." Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118, 2
L. Ed. 208 (1904).
243. JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Altos Hornos de Mexico, S.A. de C.V., 412 F.3d 418,
423 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Somerset v. Stewart, 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (1772), as reprinted in
Robert M. Cover, Justice Accused 87 (1975) (finding the doctrine of comity inapplicable
and ordering the release of an American-owned slave held on board ship in England);
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS # (8th ed. 1883).
244. Id.
245. See JP Morgan Chase Bank, 412 F.3d at 423-24 (citing Bank of Augusta v. Earle,
38 U.S. 519, 589,(1839) (citing Justice Story for the proposition that comity is
"inadmissible when contrary to [the forum state's) policy, or prejudicial to its interests").
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The courts of third-party states would similarly be justified in
finding the doctrine of international comity inapplicable to
amnesties or other transitional justice measures if the courts were
to consider these measures repugnant or in direct contradiction of
policies of the forum state. Professor Leila Sadat suggests that a
court could find that amnesties which regimes grant to themselves
or which are extracted by successor regimes with threats of
rebellion and violence are "blatantly self-interested and
illegitimate," or "against public policy and extracted by duress." 246
The district court in Chavez v. Carranza agreed when it held that
even if El Salvador's amnesty legislation conflicted directly with
the ATS, it would "run contrary to Congress' clear intent to
provide a means for victims of violations of the law of nations to
seek redress" if the court were to decline jurisdiction on the basis
of international comity. 2" However, courts hailing from states that
have assisted or encouraged the issuance of amnesties in the recent
past may have difficulty establishing that the law and policy of
their state is strongly in favor of accountability for perpetrators of
the worst crimes under international law, unless the third-party
state's officials have consistently stated, for example, that
amnesties for crimes against humanity or other specific offenses
are impermissible.
3. Courts Should Not Yield in Favor of Fora That Will Offer
Litigants No Legitimate Prospect of Recovery
A final potential prerequisite to the application of the
international comity doctrine is the availability of an adequate
remedy providing a "legitimate prospect of recovery" for the
plaintiffs in the foreign forum. 2" Several courts considering ATS
claims have found that the adequacy of the territorial state as an
alternative forum is a prerequisite to application of the doctrine of
international comity.2 9 In Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp,
246. Sadat, supra note 22, at 208.
247. Chavez v. Carranza, No. 03-2932, 2005 WL 2659186, at *5 (W.D. Tenn. 2005).
248. Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1163 (C.D. Cal.
2005). The application of the comity doctrine is in deference to a foreign amnesty or other
measure raised in the context of claims under the ATS and TVPA in the United States, as
well as in the Scilingo case in Spain.
249. See Ungaro-Benages v. Dresdner Bank AG, 379 F.3d 1227, 1238 (11th Cir. 2004);
Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153, 160 (2d Cir.1998) ("When a court dismisses on the
ground of comity, it should normally consider whether an adequate forum exists in the
objecting nation .... "); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F.
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the court noted that the doctrine of international comity as applied
to judgments from foreign courts only applies:
where there has been an opportunity for a full and fair trial
abroad before a court of competent jurisdiction.., under a
system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial
administration of justice between the citizens of its own country
and those of other countries, and there is nothing to show either
prejudice in the court, or in the systems of laws under which it
was sitting, or fraud in procuring the judgment, or any other
special reason why the comity of this nation should not allow it
full effect. 250
Thus, it determined that:
If a court may disregard a foreign judgment that is obtained
through fraud or that failed to abide by principles of due
process, similarly courts should not yield in favor of fora that
will offer litigants no legitimate prospect of recovery.... [T]he
existence of an adequate alternative forum.., is a necessary
condition to apply the doctrine of international comity. 251
Certainly, a blanket amnesty would render the foreign state
an inadequate alternate forum. However, it is less clear whether a
state that allowed victims to bring their claims against a
perpetrator to a Truth and Reconciliation Commission in their
home country and provided those victims with reparations would
satisfy the precondition for the application of international comity.
4. Some Jurisdictions Require That A "True Conflict" Exist
Between Domestic and Foreign Law in Order for the International
Comity Doctrine to be Triggered.
Even if a court does not find that a particular amnesty is
repugnant to its nation's public policy, the application of the
doctrine of international comity may still be ill-advised. As noted
above, a number of U.S. courts have found that Supreme Court
Supp. 2d 289, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("the adequacy of the forum is a prerequisite to
applying the international comity doctrine").
250. Mujica, 381 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1163 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
251. Id.
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precedent requires a predicate inquiry into whether a "true
conflict of law" exists before the doctrine of international comity
can be applied. 2 Moreover, they have defined a "conflict" as
foreign law that prohibits compliance with an order of the third-
party state. " In an ATS case dealing with events in Colombia, the
court found that because Colombia's courts had not already made
any findings of liability or provided any remedies, there was no
present conflict between domestic and foreign law, and no reason
to believe that the defendant corporation would be unable to
comply with an order or judgment of the U.S. court. ' Similarly, in
Carranza, the court found that El Salvador's amnesty law had no
effect outside the country and did not purport to prohibit
Salvadorans from bringing lawsuits elsewhere, thus there was no
conflict between the amnesty law and the ATS and TVPA in the
United States. 5 In Apartheid Litigation, Judge Scheindlin made
the same finding with regard to the TRC process in South Africa,
noting that the process was not exclusive, that the defendants had
not been granted amnesty pursuant to the process nor participated
in it, and thus that the plaintiffs retained the right to bring claims
against them; thus, ATS litigation in the United States did not
create a "true conflict" with the TRC process. 16 Employing similar
reasoning, many courts in the United States, which require a true
conflict in order to apply the international comity doctrine, may be
compelled to exercise jurisdiction over claims against individuals
despite the fact that they benefit from an amnesty in the state in
252. Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp. v. Simon (In re Simon), 153 F.3d 991, 999
(9th Cir. 1998) (citing Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 798, (1993)
(limiting the application of the international comity doctrine to cases in which "there is in
fact a true conflict between domestic and foreign law.")). See also United International
Holdings, Inc. v. Wharf Holdings Ltd., 210 F.3d 1207, 1223 (10th Cir. 2000) ("In general,
we will not consider an international comity or choice of law issue unless there is a 'true
conflict' between United States law and the relevant foreign law."); In re Maxwell
Communication Corp., 93 F.3d 1036, 1049 (2d Cir. 1996) ("International comity comes
into play only when there is a true conflict between American law and that of a foreign
jurisdiction.").
253. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 40 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 1994) ("A party
relying on foreign law to contend that a district court's order violates principles of
international comity bears the burden of demonstrating that the foreign law bars'
compliance with the order.") (emphasis added); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 873 F.2d
238, 239-40 (9th Cir. 1989).
254. Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1156 (C.D. Cal.
2005).
255. Chavez, 2005 WL 2659186, at *4.
256. In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228,285 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
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which they occurred.
As noted by the Carranza court, some states have enacted
amnesty legislation which purports to have extraterritorial effect
and bars would-be plaintiffs from raising claims against alleged
perpetrators in any forum, not just the domestic courts in their
home country. It is these sorts of provisions, like the
Compensation Act at issue in Rio Tinto, that raise the specter of a
"true conflict" and trigger the applicability of the doctrine of
international comity in the United States. That statute prohibited
citizens of Papua New Guinea from filing claims involving foreign
mining projects in foreign courts, which is exactly what the
plaintiffs in the ATS suit before the Ninth Circuit had attempted
to do. 8 If a court in a third-party state encounters such a
provision, it should not automatically defer to the laws of the
territorial state. Rather, at that point, the court is justified in
applying a reasoned analysis under the international comity
doctrine.
5. If There is a "True Conflict," or if the Jurisdiction Does Not
Require a Conflict in Order to Trigger the Comity Inquiry, then
the Court Should Decline to Exercise Jurisdiction Only if Doing
Otherwise Would Be "Unreasonable."
Even if international law has not yet crystallized around an
obligation on the part of states to prosecute perpetrators of
international criminal offenses (i.e. crimes against humanity, war
crimes in internal conflicts, and extrajudicial executions),
pronouncements by the UN and other international bodies suggest
that such an obligation may very well be developing. Sadat and
others have argued that the courts of third-party states should
begin an international comity analysis with a presumption that
deference should not be shown to the amnesty in the territorial
state. 5 9 Thereafter, courts should apply whatever test is typically
applied in their country in order to assess whether international
comity should be shown. In the United States, this test is laid out
in the Restatement § 403, which instructs courts to award comity if
exercising jurisdiction over the activity would be
"unreasonable." 26 The Restatement provides a "nonexhaustive"
257. Id. at *34.
258. Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1201 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
259. Sadat, supra note 22, at 210.
260. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATION LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
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list of factors to be considered in making such a reasonableness
determination, the overarching effect of which is to ask the court
to weigh the interests of the third-party state in adjudicating the
claim against the interests of the territorial state in doing so
itself. "
Several of the factors outlined in §403(2) have been identified
by the U.S. courts as indicating a strong third-party state interest in
adjudicating claims alleging internationally-prohibited conduct.
For example, -the court in Filartiga v. Peha-Irala262 held that any
claim over which a U.S. court could exercise jurisdiction pursuant
to the ATS would necessarily entail "a wrong of mutual, and not
merely several, concern to states." 263 Other courts have echoed
these sentiments since that time, arguing that "the nations of the
world have demonstrated that such wrongs are.., capable of
impairing international peace and security.""M Some courts have
recognized that when a plaintiff's claims allege violations of norms
not merely cognizable under the ATS and/or TVPA, but also
constituting jus cogens, the United States would have a particularly
strong interest in their adjudication, since they constitute offenses
of universal concern by virtue of "the depths of the depravity the
conduct encompasses, the often countless toll of human suffering
the misdeeds inflict upon the victims, and the consequential
disruption of the domestic and international order they
produce." 265
§ 403(1) (1987).
261. Id. at § 403(2) ("Whether exercise of jurisdiction over a person or activity is
unreasonable is determined by evaluating all relevant factors, including, where
appropriate: (a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the
extent to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has a substantial, direct, and
foreseeable effect upon or in the territory; (b) the connections, such as nationality,
residence, or economic activity, between the regulating state and the person principally
responsible for the activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the
regulation is designed to protect; (c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the
importance of regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate
such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally
accepted; (d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the
regulation; (e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or
economic system; (f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of
the international system; (g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in
regulating the activity; and (h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another
state.").
262. Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F. 2d 876, 888 (2d Cir. 1980).
263. Id.
264. Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233,249 (2d Cir. 2003).
265. Tachonia v. Mugabe, 234 F. Supp. 2d 401,416 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); see also
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
It is only in the context of a full comity analysis that the views
of the adjudicating state's executive branch should be considered
with respect to any risks that adjudication of the private claims at
issue might pose to the stability of the territorial state or to
international peace and security. Even then, the courts should not
automatically defer to the views of the executive branch of their
government. Rather, separation of powers and rule of law
principles require the courts to afford the opinions of the executive
branch with "persuasive deference." For the purposes of the
international comity doctrine, the executive's opinions (as well as
those of the governments of other countries) are akin to expert
testimony on the likelihood of political repercussions. Certainly,
they are worthy of consideration, but they should also be
evaluated by the court for persuasiveness and for consistency with
other factual information. 6 7 Thus, in Rio Tinto, the Ninth Circuit
weighed a Statement of Interest (SOI) from the U.S. State
Department suggesting that adjudication of claims arising in Papua
New Guinea would interfere with the ongoing peace process there,
with factual submissions from participants in the Bougainville
peace process and members of the PNG government indicating
that conditions in PNG had changed since the SOI had been
written. " Similarly, the Talisman court held in relation to other
third-party state requests for comity that
[W]hile a court may decline to hear a lawsuit that may interfere
with [another] State's foreign policy... dismissal is only
warranted as a matter of international comity where the nexus
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 343
(S.D.N.Y. 2003); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 106 (2d Cir. 2000)
(stating that the enactment of the TVPA "communicated a policy that such suits should
not be facilely dismissed on the assumption that the ostensibly foreign controversy is not
our business").
266. Curtis Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REv. 649, 680-
81 (2000) ("as with many issues concerning federal policy, 'persuasiveness deference' may
be proper. But these forms of deference are not Chevron deference ....").
267. As Judge Hall noted in the Second Circuit's recent Khulumani decision: "Mere
executive fiat cannot control the disposition of a case before a federal court. Our principle
of separation of powers not only counsels the judiciary to conduct an independent inquiry
- it requires us to do so. Regardless of what else Sosa holds, it did not doubt that ATCA
suits are law suits constitutionally entrusted to the judiciary .... Thus a district court must
weigh the [SOI], as well as other relevant facts, in ... exercising its own discretion before
deciding whether to dismiss a compliant." 504 F.3d at 292 (Hall, J., concurring); see also
Beth Stevens, Upsetting Checks and Balances: The Bush Administration's Effort to Limit
Human Rights Litigation, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 170, 191 (2004).
268. Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1206-07 (C.D. Cal.2002).
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between the lawsuit and the foreign policy is sufficiently
apparent and the importance of the relevant foreign policy
outweighs the public's interest in vindicating the values
advanced by the lawsuit. 269
6. Courts Should Decline to Exercise Jurisdiction if Doing So
Would Violate the Principle of "Double Jeopardy" or "Ne Bis En
Idem"
One additional consideration not specifically articulated in
the Restatement test is the risk that an exercise of jurisdiction by a
third-party state over a particular individual would violate the
principle of "double criminality." While this risk is not posed in
situations involving a blanket amnesty, it may arise if a territorial
state has enacted a conditional amnesty requiring truth-telling or
measures such as reduced sentences or community service
requirements for perpetrators, as have South Africa, Colombia,
East Timor, and Rwanda, among others. Sadat argues, "in the case
of conditional amnesties, where the defendant has voluntarily
come forward and placed him or herself in jeopardy of prosecution
by confessing the crime.., the forum state should examine the
particular proceeding to see if the principle of ne bis en idem
should attach and immunize the particular defendant from
subsequent prosecutions." 270 She argues that where a particular
transitional justice mechanism has employed "judicial or quasi-
judicial proceedings and... particularized consideration of a
defendant's guilt or innocence,", a defendant may have already
been "put in jeopardy" of criminal proceedings.27 Similarly,
Douglas Cassel has argued that the practice of awarding reduced
punishments in return for confessions by perpetrators, employed
by the ICTR, ICTY, and Colombia, is permissible under
269. See Talisman, 2005 WL 2082846, at *7 (rejecting Canada's request for comity on
the grounds that an ATS lawsuit would interfere with its policy of using the prospect of
future trade and economic revitalization in Sudan).
270. Sadat, supra note 22, at 336 n.135.
271. Id. at 337 n.142. Michael Scharf has similarly noted that individuals accused of
committing violations of international criminal law before the ICC may be able to invoke
Article 20 of the Rome Statute, which codifies the ne bis in idem principle in certain
situations if their territorial state has undertaken some measure more rigorous than a
blanket amnesty but still less so than a full criminal prosecution. See Schart supra note 53,
at 525.
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This is not to suggest that any transitional justice measure
more rigorous than amnesty will raise the spectre of double
criminality. As the recent decision of the Constitutional Court for
Colombia to strike down some portions of its sentencing program
demonstrates, there may be a certain threshold at which a sentence
or punishment is too disproportionately light to completely
extinguish an individual's liability. 73 Additionally, the Inter-
American Commission found in a case involving Chile that the
mere fact that Chile had created a truth commission and enacted
reparations did not obviate the need for investigation or even
criminal punishment of those responsible for large-scale
"disappearances" and other crimes. 274 Thus, courts evaluating such
transitional mechanisms should do so on a case-by-case basis,
considering the type of proceeding adopted, whether individual
guilt was established, and the proportionality of any punishment
imposed.
272. Douglas Cassel, Professor, Notre Dame Law School, Written Testimony Before
the Constitutional Court of Indonesia (July 6, 2006), in INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (ICTJ) AMICUS BRIEF TO THE INDONESIAN CONSTITUTIONAL
COURT, July 2006, at 11 [hereinafter Cassel, Written Testimony Before the Constitutional
Court of Indonesia] (citing ICTY, Prosecutor v. Plavsic, Case IT-00-39&40/1, Trial
Chamber, Sentencing Judgment, 27 February 2003, IT 66-81).
273. Id. (noting that the Constitutional Court for Colombia struck down key portions
of Colombia's Justice and Peace Law in May 2006. That law allowed reduced sentences for
members of illegal armed groups who confessed to certain serious crimes. The Court
found that provisions are what allowed individuals to apply up to eighteen months of time
spent in demobilization camps as part of their period of imprisonment. As those
perpetrators were only serving between five and eight years for crimes against humanity in
the first place, this provision effectively allowed perpetrators of some of the worst crimes
known to man to serve only three and a half years in prison. The Court ruled that time
spent in demobilization camps could not be counted toward the minimum prison time, so
that minimum imprisonment would truly be five years, and that individuals would have to
disclose all offenses in order to receive such a reduced sentence, with a threat of additional
time applied if additional information regarding crimes committed was later uncovered.
Individuals and groups benefiting from the reduced sentences were also ordered to pay
reparations to their victims.).
274. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Professor, UC Hastings Law School, Written Testimony
Before the Constitutional Court of Indonesia (July 6, 2006), in INTERNATIONAL CENTER
FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (ICTJ) AMICUS BRIEF TO THE INDONESIAN
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, July 2006, at 3 [hereinafter Roht-Arriaza, Written Testimony
Before the Constitutional Court of Indonesia] (citing Carmelo Soria Espinoza v. Chile,
Case 11.725, Report No 133/99, OEA/Ser.L IV/II.106 Doc. 3 rev. at 494 (1999)).
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7. If the Territorial State has Authorized an Ongoing Truth and
Reconciliation Commission or Similar Institution with the Power
to Recommend Prosecutions, the International Abstention
Doctrine May Allow the Court to Decline to Exercise Jurisdiction.
The doctrine of international abstention, another non-
justiciability doctrine may encourage a third-party state to decline
to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction where the territorial state
has authorized an ongoing truth and reconciliation commission
with the power to recommend prosecutions. In contrast to the
doctrine of international comity, which focuses on prior judgments
and legislative decisions made by a foreign state, the doctrine of
international abstention is typically applied in the context of
parallel judicial proceedings regarding the same claim but ongoing
in more than one state. 5 When deciding whether to defer an
action in favor of an ongoing truth commission or other
transitional justice mechanism in the territorial state, a court
should balance the interests of the third-party state, the territorial
state, and the international community. 276 If, as in the truth
commission example, the territorial state has "taken explicit,
targeted steps to address the situation giving rise to the litigation in
the [third-party state]," and- such steps include at least quasi-
judicial proceedings, the third-party state's courts may be justified
in dismissing claims without prejudice until those proceedings have
concluded in the territorial state. 27 If the territorial state does not
implement a reparations program or provide some sort of recovery
at the conclusion of the TRC process, the claimants would then be
free to bring their claims before the third-party state's courts.
D. Inquiry #3: Applicability of the Political Question Doctrine
Even if the doctrines of international comity and international
abstention allow extraterritorial jurisdiction over claims subject to
275. Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1160 (C.D. Cal.
2005) (citing Ungaro-Benages v. Dresdner Bank AG, 379 F.3d 1227, 1238 (11th Cir.
2004)); see also Laker Airways.Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 939
(D.C. Cir. 1984).
276. Id. ("federal courts evaluate several factors, including the strength of the United
States' interest in using a foreign forum, the strength of the foreign governments' interests,
and the adequacy of the alternative forum").
277. Id. at 1163.
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an amnesty in the territorial state, the political question doctrine
might still provide third-party courts with a legal basis for
declining jurisdiction. This doctrine requires courts to dismiss
individual claims otherwise properly presented to the courts for
adjudication if: (1) it would be impossible for the court to
undertake independent resolution of the issue without expressing
a lack of respect towards coordinate branches of the government;
(2) the case implicates an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made by the government
of the third-party state; or (3) the case creates the potential for the
third-party state to be embarrassed about multifarious
pronouncements made by various departments on one question.
1. Claims Brought Pursuant to Statutes Providing for
Extraterritorial and/or Universal Jurisdiction are Generally
Justiciable; Courts Should Award No More than "Persuasiveness"
Deference to the Views of the Executive Branch
As established by several courts, the political question
doctrine is an exception to the principle of separation of powers, in
which a state's judiciary declines to adjudicate a question of law
despite the fact that the legislature has previously given it the
power to do so. 279 Thus, it would be inappropriate for courts to
dismiss claims on the basis of the political question doctrine sua
sponte, in the absence of a specific request that they do so from the
political branches of their government. Where the views of the
executive branch are given deference in the course of an
international comity inquiry, they are to be awarded "serious
weight," but not "complete deference" in the context of an inquiry
under the political question doctrine, particularly when a given
state has more than one "political branch" with authority to
express an interest in adjudication of a particular claim. In the
Sarei case, the Ninth Circuit affirmed that the Executive Branch's
view did not control the determination of whether a political
question existed, in keeping with prior determinations by other
circuits. " Finding otherwise would have threatened to render the
278. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
279. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 250 (2d Cir. 1995); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATION LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111(2) (1987).
280. Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1201(C.D. Cal. 2002) ("ultimately, it is
our responsibility to determine whether a political question is present, rather than to
dismiss on that ground simply because the Executive Branch expresses some hesitancy
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court "a mere errand boy for the Executive Branch, which may
choose to pick some people's chestnuts from the fire, but not
others. '' " Recently, two prominent scholars emphasized that
courts dealing with claims based on international law should not
award more than "respectful consideration" to the views of the
Executive Branch. Excessive judicial deference would have the
effect of substituting the long-term perspective embodied in the
judiciary for the short-term and self-interested perspective of the
Executive during times of international stress, undermining the
rule of law in the area most concerned with restraining executive
power in times of crisis. '
In the recent Apartheid Litigation decision, Judge Scheindlin
similarly awarded less than complete deference to the views of the
Executive Branch in the course of her political question doctrine
inquiry. First, she found that "the Executive Branch is not owed
deference on every topic; rather this Court will give serious
consideration to the Executive's views only with regard to the
case's 'impact on foreign policy,'" ' and also that "deference does
not mean delegation; the views of the Executive Branch-even
where deference is due-are but one factor to consider and are not
dispositive. '' 21 Subsequently, in considering the United States'
Statement of Interest in the case, Judge Scheindlin analyzed it
critically, finding that it relied on an "erroneous premise": that the
court's assertion of jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims would
second-guess the decision made by the United States to permit and
encourage commerce with South Africa during the Apartheid era.
Judge Scheindlin rejected that premise, finding that any claim that
adjudicating the case "would have a substantial chilling effect on
about a case proceeding"); see also Nat'l Petrochemical Co. of Iran v. M/T Stolt Sheaf, 860
F.2d 551, 555-56 (2d Cir. 1988) (reviewing executive SOI for "arbitrariness"); Ungaro-
Benages, 379 F.3d at 1236 ("a statement of national interest alone...does not take the
present litigation outside the competence of the judiciary"); Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222
(1968) (while the Administration's views were nevertheless entitled to review the
underlying facts submitted to it, as well as the position of the United States for consistency
across successive presidencies).
281. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 773 (1972)
(Douglas, J., concurring).
282. Derek Jinks & Neal Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J.
1230, 1262-63 (2007).
283. See In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
(citing.City of New York v. Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations, 446 F.3d
365,376, n.17 (2d Cir. 2006).
284. Id. (citing Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 263-64 & n. 13).
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doing lawful business in a pariah state" was "speculative at best." "
Moreover, she rejected the SOI's additional concern that
"adjudication of these cases will be an irritant in U.S.-South
African relations," finding that "[a] speculative conflict with the
goal of maintaining good relations with a foreign nation ...... is
not the type of conflict that normally triggers dismissal under the
political question doctrine." ' Thus, while Judge Scheindlin
considered the Executive Branch's SOI, she ultimately found its
opinions unpersuasive and declined to defer to them.
2. The Political Question Doctrine May Require Dismissal of a
Case Where the Government of the State Purporting to Assert
Jurisdiction was Involved in the Negotiation of the Amnesty.
As demonstrated above, there is one situation in which the
political question doctrine may unavoidably counsel the courts of a
third-party state to decline jurisdiction over internationally-
recognized offenses: when the political branches of that state
played an active role in the negotiation of the amnesty (or
transitional justice measure) in question, or even strongly
endorsed the measure after its enactment. Certainly, if a court
were to determine that a coordinate branch of its own government
encouraged another state to violate its own international duty to
hold perpetrators of such offenses accountable, such a finding
would likely "embarrass" the forum's government. As long as the
political question doctrine remains a valid ground for determining
the justiciability of a claim, and as long as "embarrassment" is seen
as a valid ground for abstention, the doctrine would seem to
permit the courts to decline to exercise jurisdiction in such
situations.
VI. CONCLUSION
State practice in the areas of amnesty and extraterritorial
jurisdiction reveal that there has been a paradigm shift from
impunity to accountability in the wake of political transitions in
the last quarter-century. Today, the leaders of states throughout
the world are often constrained in their ability to "wipe the slate
clean" in the aftermath of various atrocities. While perpetrators of
egregious international offenses remain able to evade punishment
285. Id.
286. Id. n.349.
464 [Vol. 31:405
The Clash of Obligations
for their actions, the tide is clearly turning in favor of
accountability. The increasing willingness of third-party states to
condemn those responsible for certain deplorable offenses has a
strong potential to strengthen this trend of accountability,
provided that states exercise their judicial authority in a principled
manner.
This paper has demonstrated that there are a host of
situations in which it is perfectly acceptable for a court to decline
to exercise jurisdiction over offenses arising outside its territory,
particularly when the state in which the offenses occurred has
made (or is in the process of making) a legitimate effort to hold
the perpetrators accountable for their actions. However, the
decision to decline jurisdiction should not be made out of a general
hesitance to adjudicate claims arising abroad, or even as a reaction
to opposition expressed by certain political actors, unless their
arguments for abstention are independently convincing. Third-
party state-courts which have been delegated the responsibility to
adjudicate such claims are in a unique position to provide such
accountability in situations in which it may be unavailable
elsewhere. It is their duty to exercise that power responsibly so
that the "clash of obligatiohs" does not result in a reaffirmation of
the rule of men, but rather in a resounding confirmation of the
international rule of law in the area in which the potential to
promote international peace and security is the strongest.
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